40 The War on Aging axons are extremely short, small parts of the new brain could be constructed in separate vessels, leaving only a small minor- ity of connections to be made to link these modules together.) If this were performed at close to zero degrees Centigrade, no electrical activity would occur during construction; such a brain (after installation into a much more straightforwardly reconstructed body) could then be ‘awakened’ simply by slow warming, much as people often recover from hypothermia- induced comas. In this way, a human could be created with the cognitive (and, if necessary, an improvement on the physi- cal) state of someone deceased, even in the absence (which I suspect will be with us for a very long time indeed) of a detailed understanding of how that cognitive state results from that synaptic network. It is the lack of need for such under- standing that distinguishes this procedure from the transfer of our cognitive state to radically different hardware on which it would actually ‘run’, which is the essence of the full-blown ‘uploading’ concept introduced by Moravec. [21] If so, who would the constructed person be? They would surely claim to be the deceased person. It would be difficult to disagree, because we already have a precedent: corporeal continuity is not the basis for our emotional attachment to the person who fell asleep in our bed last night or the one who will wake up in our bed tomorrow. Rather, we iden- tify  with  that  person  because  we  know  that  their  state  of mind  –  irrespective  of  how  many  atoms  their  body  shares with ours – was/will be so deeply similar to our own that they were/will be unarguably us. This line of thought plainly raises phenomenal philosophical questions about identity (in cases where someone is constructed from a backup of someone who is not dead, for example), but I suspect that such esotericisms will not long restrain us when we see it as a way out of the by then intolerably risk-averse character of our existence. This is the final step in my argument for supposing that even the first