The multiverse as a way to explain away information

Our universe has climbed mount improbable. We are improbable. We are humans, and we have our own particular conception of intelligence, which we seem to crown as the pinnacle of existence. We have done this for thousands of years in various forms (god-mind as archetype of humans, for example). AI theorists create AGI, artificial general intelligence. We can't think of anything better than general intelligence. We can't think of any other "mount improbables", and we think of our own universe in terms of objects and probabilities. So when we find that our universe is apparently fine-tuned for our existence, we look for something quantitative and outside of our own universe. It doesn't produce very many constructive results, but it satisfies us to explain away information that we can't thoroughly explain.

My idea is not that there is no multiverse. I sometimes find it difficult to imagine the non-existence of a multiverse. My idea is that without quite direct evidence, multiverse theories can be a way to explain away information, which is a lot easier than coming up with constructive ideas. Needless to say, this is different from saying that there is no multiverse.

For multiverse theories, I think the de facto standards of empirical warrant have been set too low in some cases. In many cases, people simply assign high prior probability to the existence of a multiverse. Maybe there are some other very strange possibilities which could explain the apparent fine-tuning of the universe. Multiverse theory generally entails that the observed apparent fine-tuning of the universe can be explained by an observation selection effect (maybe there is a multiverse, intelligent observers are quite complex and improbable, so it is quite typical that us human observers observe a finely-tuned universe). Could we introduce a new theory, MultiExplanation, which entails that the observed necessity of a multiverse theory can be explained by an observation selection effect (that our fishing vessel named "Science" has a net quite likely to catch multiverse theories, due to the popularity of bayesian reasoning)? This is controversial because scientists don't like to be psychoanalyzed. Generally scientists are a lot more logical than other people, but I think every group of people has bias.

Here is one strange idea:

Information and complexity are requirements for intelligence. Information might even be a primitive of intelligence (and other things). So maybe one obvious observation selection effect is that we observe everything else in our universe as less complex than us. Random vibrations do not make observations, an observation is a complex pattern. So we know of the existence of one "mount improbable", with intelligence currently at the peak. But maybe intelligence does not as generally describe a singular pinnacle of information or complexity as we seem to think. If we think multiple (and strange) universes are plausible, then why not multiple (and strange) mount improbables, all based on information or complexity? So instead of considering ourselves a part of the 'observer' reference class, we can observe ourselves as part of the "complex information" reference class.

I will continue the strange idea with two points.

1) We haven't really explored all of the permutations of the structure of the universe enough to rule out the plausibility of other complex "mount improbables" in alternative versions of our universe. We don't understand our own physics and we haven't even figured out if different values for various seemingly arbitrary constants would always result in low information/complexity.
2) The purpose of the multiverse theory seems to be to "explain away" information. But this is not just Occam's Razor, it is Thor's Axe. Do we have a universal scale of information which our universe surprisingly breaks? Why wouldn't our universe contain information that seems very complex to us? What makes it improbable? Maybe our universe actually contains a "low" quantity of information. If we want to argue for a multiverse, we should find more direct evidence that the information in our universe is/was the result of some information outside of our universe. The probabilistic argument for multiverse is insufficient here because it is simply based on the way we think about our own "particular" universe.

So in other words, if we're going to get strange, why not get really really strange? I hope it makes sense.

I have to admit I am a bit confused. I would very much like to respond to your post in full, but don't have time at the moment.

I don't know much about multiverse theory, but I will say one thing: I think it's mostly confused terminology. If we are going to define the universe as everything that exists, then any kind of "multiverse" would be included in that definition. Multiverse is of course an invented term to describe "universes" that don't behave "like our universe."

I think you have good points. Our science, which is fallable, has a certain scope. That scope is limited, and therefore the conclusions we can draw are limited.

OK, I have to go.

Edited by Vgamer1, 26 September 2009 - 01:20 AM.

Definition and argument:

[1] In most arguments about multiverse theories in general, universes are fairly causally disconnected regions of space-time.
Paraphrased from Nick Bostrom's book "Anthropic Bias".

[2] The physics of our universe is apparently fine-tuned for the development of complex life.
So it is unexplained why our universe seems to have started with a seed of information leading to the development of complex life.

[3] If there is a staggering multiplicity of universes, we don't need to explain nor understand our own surprise that we (i) exist, (ii) are improbable, and (iii) we don't quite know why yet.
Depending on the multiverse theory, we can either deduce that there exists a finely tuned universe like ours, or induce that there is a high probability of the existence of a finely tuned universe like ours. Multiverse theories are also a good alternative to the "god" hypothesis, but a multiverse theory doesn't have to be demonstrated to be accurate to be instrumental in criticizing theological arguments. Even a thought experiment posing a multiverse theory against the god hypothesis is effective in reducing one's credence in the god hypothesis.

Some reasons I posted this in the AI & Singularity forum:

[1] I think multiverse theory is motivated by the view that general intelligence as we define it is the pinnacle of forms
There is also some evidence in physics supporting inflation theory, which is the kind of evidence I think really does support multiverse theories. I hope we can get some more answers by observing gravitational waves. But that doesn't change my view that multiverse theories were originally and still generally are motivated by the view that we have figured out most of the possibilities in our own universe, and that intelligence and probability are somehow the solutions to our metaphysical problems. If we are going to go as far as hypothesizing a multiverse of strange theories we know practically nothing about, then why not a multiplicity of possible forms we know nothing about? If we are talking strange, then I am allowed to say strange things like "maybe there is something better than general intelligence".

[2] Ray Kurzweil's Sixth Epoch

Epoch 6. The Universe Wakes Up

This seems to imply that the entire universe will necessarily embody intelligence - and intelligence is the pinnacle of forms. It makes sense if you consider evolution and complexity theory. I also think it is quite vague and often seems to imply the existence of some ideal or absolutely general intelligence. I don't think Ray has really made any serious arguments about why the sixth epoch will necessarily occur, or what in fact it is.

[3] Nick Bostrom's "Are You Living In a Computer Simulation" paper

1 Almost all civilisations at our level of development become extinct before becoming technologically mature.
2 The fraction of technologically mature civilisations that are interested in creating ancestor simulations is almost zero.
3 You are almost certainly living in a computer simulation.

Firstly I am not disagreeing with Nick Bostrom's paper. But I am imagining a lot of people imagining other universes with life-forms roughly analogous to ours. The paper is not restrictive in it's conclusions, and it effectively leaves open the idea of what "civilization" means.

[4] Why I think all of this matters

Believing in a multiverse theory can encourage a person to reason along the following line......
"Intelligence is improbable in any universe like mine where the fundamental constants are randomly assigned, 'intelligent observer' is my reference class, no other complex forms that are possible in any alternative versions of my universe are fit to be in my reference class, therefore there must be lots of universes rolling the dice to win some intelligent observers (usually it is called life)"

....whereas I think they should reconsider whether "intelligent observer" is the relevant reference class to consider. Maybe there is a multiverse in which there is only one universe with one planet with anything like what we call "intelligent observers", and maybe there are universes teeming with other remarkable forms of complexity. In fact, maybe if our universe had a different set of physical constants, our universe would be teeming with another remarkably different form of complexity. And if not, we still can only say that a multiverse theory makes everything seem clearer to us - it clears up our cognitive dissonance. To me that doesn't empirically warrant me to claim the truth of any multiverse theory.

Many people who argue for multiverse theories seem to alternate between talking about "queer" universes that we couldn't understand, and universes that are working towards general intelligence, with life-forms and everything. That makes it sound sort of like there are "intelligent" universes and "sick" universes, and nothing else. I object.

Maybe I should add that I am not convinced that "general intelligence" is ultimately 'general'. I think it ultimately depends on a lot of things, like the physics of whatever intelligent system we are investigating. I imagine that in the future we might see a paradigm shift where 'matter' and 'information' merge. But that's beside the point.

Edited by exapted, 26 September 2009 - 08:31 AM.

[4] Why I think all of this matters

Believing in a multiverse theory can encourage a person to reason along the following line......
"Intelligence is improbable in any universe like mine where the fundamental constants are randomly assigned, 'intelligent observer' is my reference class, no other complex forms that are possible in any alternative versions of my universe are fit to be in my reference class, therefore there must be lots of universes rolling the dice to win some intelligent observers (usually it is called life)"

Here's where I have a problem, and maybe you agree with me.

First of all to assume that universes are built by randomly assigning values to constants seems very arbitrary to me.... We don't know of the physics that bring rise to these constants. It may be the best guess we have for what "other universes" may be like, but who knows? Maybe in other universes all of the constants are the same, but instead of F = ma, the equation is F = mv - which would be very strange indeed.

Secondly to call these "other universes" as such, is misleading to me. Like I said before. If it exists, it can be classified as a subset of the universe. I feel that "multiverse" is a confused term. I understand what they are trying to get at, but really all they are doing is making it harder on the layman.

I almost feel like they do it to get people to go "Woa! Other universes?? I thought there was only one universe?? Wow, science is cool!!"

[4] Why I think all of this matters

Believing in a multiverse theory can encourage a person to reason along the following line......
"Intelligence is improbable in any universe like mine where the fundamental constants are randomly assigned, 'intelligent observer' is my reference class, no other complex forms that are possible in any alternative versions of my universe are fit to be in my reference class, therefore there must be lots of universes rolling the dice to win some intelligent observers (usually it is called life)"

Here's where I have a problem, and maybe you agree with me.

First of all to assume that universes are built by randomly assigning values to constants seems very arbitrary to me.... We don't know of the physics that bring rise to these constants. It may be the best guess we have for what "other universes" may be like, but who knows? Maybe in other universes all of the constants are the same, but instead of F = ma, the equation is F = mv - which would be very strange indeed.

Secondly to call these "other universes" as such, is misleading to me. Like I said before. If it exists, it can be classified as a subset of the universe. I feel that "multiverse" is a confused term. I understand what they are trying to get at, but really all they are doing is making it harder on the layman.

I almost feel like they do it to get people to go "Woa! Other universes?? I thought there was only one universe?? Wow, science is cool!!"

Yes I completely agree it is quite arbitrary to assume that universes are built by randomly assigning values to constants. The idea is, if we reached a point where we thought we understood the physics of our universe thoroughly, and we found some arbitrary fundamental constants finely tuned for the development of complexity, it would be somehow unsatisfying. That much is true. So the idea is that there might be a lot of other universes with different values for those constants. And yes there could be universes with completely different or strange physics, but constants are just a lot easier to explain and quantify (as a proof of concept). Then we could explain the values of the constants of our physics as a result of chance and an observation selection effect (we observe this finely tuned universe because this is the only kind of universe where there are any observers around).

The problem I have with that line of reasoning is that

A) we don't really know if our universe is finely tuned to the development of complexity where if any of the constants were changed the universe would be simple and unremarkable
B) we haven't even imagined another type of complex system, different from what we call "intelligence". we assume "intelligent observer" is the only relevant reference class for any observation selection effect. maybe there's nothing special at all about observation.
C) even if our universe is finely tuned for complexity, the argument based on chance and an observation selection effect (as above) only works if you assign a high enough prior probability to a multiverse and a low prior probability for anything else that would explain fine tuning. if you have a high prior probability for 'god', an apparently finely tuned universe should increase your credence in the god hypothesis too, does that mean there is a god? there are probably a lot of plausible explanations for a finely tuned universe that you could assign a high prior probability to. but it is much easier to invoke probability theory and observation selection effects.

By the way I have no problem with the multiverse hypothesis per se, but I just see it as a neat little method to clean up cognitive dissonance related to the apparent fine tuning of our universe. Like you said, universe is supposed to mean 'everything' right? So basically multiverse theories say "the universe is a lot bigger than we used to think". But as stated before, the god hypothesis can account for fine-tuning too (and I'm basically an atheist, a tea-pot agnostic). Only direct physical evidence, some "signature" of a multiverse could convince me.