Consciousness: Is There A "hard Problem"?

Lazarus has suggested that I start a new thread regarding the possibility of quantum effects influencing human cognition, and I've been meaning to start a discussion on the topic of minds and consciousness in general (plus Sophianic was going to elaborate for us on his skepticism about "Strong" AI), so here it is. Since there is very little phil. of mind talk going on in this forum, this topic is intended to be about mind tout court, so discuss whatever you want to, and if it gets too confusing, we can split it into different threads. I'll get the ball rolling.

One of the most obnoxious chimeras of contemporary philosophy of mind is the concept of "qualia", a term generally used to refer to allegedly intrinsic, causally disconnected properties of experience, the what's-it-likeness of being, in Nagel's terms. The most famous proponent of this theory is almost certainly Chalmers, and his most vocal opponent is probably Dennett, so to introduce the discussion, here is something of an exchange between the two which appeared in The Journal of Consciousness Studies a few years ago.

Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness (Chalmers' keynote paper)

Facing Backwards on the Problem of Consciousness (Dennett's response)

Moving Forward on the Problem of Consciousness (Chalmers' reply to the 26 criticisms of his original paper in JCS)

Are we Explaining Consciousness Yet? (An unrelated paper by Dennett, clarifying some of his views)

Comments? Arguments? Opinions? Incidentally, I'm aware that some of this stuff can seem pretty dense, so I'll try and see if I can't dig up a shorter version of the debate somewhere.

Very interesting subject. I've tried really hard to believe in qualia, but in the end I don't see anything "special" or any characteristic difference in sentient minds outside of cleanly causal cognitive functioning. I've come across these papers before, but never read them all the way through because I had my mind settled about exactly The Way Things Were halfway through most of the text. But I'll read all the papers this weekend, and formulate a response. And thanks for initiating such a quality/challenging discussion, Psychodelirium.

It's emotionally hard to understand, that *my* SELF is just a program, running currently on many other places as well.

Some kind of self referencing program - that's what I am.

The only possible view is, that *this* instance is just another instance of that old same SELF program.

Am I a reincarnated Budha? Are you a reincarnated me, even before I died? Was Charles Darwin an early incarnatation of Ingrid Bergman?

Yes, yes and yes.

[blush]

- Thomas

I'm glad I'm a program. Leaves room for improved coding, which could be very fun. Hopefully humanity's formal systems (their minds) can cross over the big hump and get to the Singularity.

Lots of talk here about programming, but precious little about the experience and importance of awareness in the production of sentience and general intelligence.

My current objection to Strong AI revolves around whether the computational model is sufficient to produce sentience: the experiences of intentionality, subjectivity and awareness, with these three related implications:

1) the realization of value
2) the appreciation of value
3) the contemplation of value

I also make a distinction between the simulation and emulation of intelligence (and sentience for that matter). They are not the same. Not even close.

If a synthetic agent of AI runs a program that makes it appear that it is sentient or intelligent, that to me is a simulation - weak AI.

If, however, a synthetic agent of AI (along with certain as yet unknown biological components incorporated into its systems) runs a program in tandem with the fact of its sentience or intelligence, that to me is an emulation that successfully rivals, if not exceeds, human function - strong AI.

Thus,

1) I work hard to produce a result. I realize a value. I feel pride. Can a purely material, synthetic embodiment of sophisticated programming emulate this realization (I said emulate, not simulate). I must say no.

2) I take some time off from work and kick back with a cold one on a beach front. I feel good and feel quite relaxed. Can a purely material, synthetic embodiment of sophisticated programming emulate this appreciation. Again, I must say no.

3) I settle down with my cold one and contemplate the stars when they come out. I feel a sense of mystery, a sense of awe at the sheer immensity of space and time. Can a purely material, synthetic embodiment of sophisticated programming emulate this contemplation. Again, I must say no.

Can a synthetic embodiment of intelligence simulate human function and behavior in every possible way? I don't see why not. But this is not emulation. This is not strong AI. This is simulation, pure and simple. Weak AI.

Of course, all of this begs the question. Why must there necessarily be any biological components grafted onto, or incorporated into, a synthetic embodiment to produce sentience and intelligence, and therefore emulation (i.e., Strong AI)? I'm afraid I don't have the answer to that question. If I did, I think I'd be a very rich man.

There's another, related, question to the production of Strong AI, and that is the question of freewill (or free will). Is volition biologically inherent to human function? And if it is, does that inherence make it impossible to produce sentience in a purely synthetic embodiment because that inherence has a biological origin? I think this is another (but important) way to approach the question.

I must apologize, but I may not have time to debate this issue further. But I do welcome constructive feedback.

ACtually Soph, "Experience" is the Hard question. I have been reviewing the articles suggested and have been preparing a response because the point you are making is directly relevant.

The Journal and the articles are valuable for any serious study of what is meant by cognition and awareness.

They are not too long or complex a read. I suggest their review before too much more debate.

Chalmers said:

The really hard problem of consciousness is the problem of experience. When we think and perceive, there is a whir of information-processing, but there is also a subjective aspect. As Nagel (1974) has put it, there is something it is like to be a conscious organism. This subjective aspect is experience.

See what I mean?

Lots of talk here about programming, but precious little about the experience and importance of awareness in the production of sentience and general intelligence.

Agreed, it strikes me that some of the respondents are missing the point.

For instance, Michael writes, "I've tried really hard to believe in qualia, but in the end I don't see anything "special" or any characteristic difference in sentient minds outside of cleanly causal cognitive functioning." This statement makes me very suspicious, because I for one have had to try really hard not to believe in qualia before I could begin to develop my own perspective. Why? Well, as Chalmers tells us, "it is prima facie obvious" that there is irreducible subjective experience. I do not really agree with this, but I do agree with Dennett that it is obvious that there is a very powerful intuition that tempts us to accept this position. Dennett calls it the "zombic hunch", and I will elaborate later as to why. It seems to me that anyone who understands what Chalmers is talking about is going to feel the zombic hunch. I feel it, as does Dennett, but we have come to accept positions that run contrary to intuition.

Thomas and Davidov inform us that they are "programs", but it is important to realize that Chalmers does not necessarily dispute this (although certain other critics, e.g. Penrose and Searle, do). Chalmers might presumably agree that our brains are wet computers running certain sorts of programs, but he would also note that they are wet computers that have conscious subjective experiences, and he wonders how this can be so, and how this could possibly be reconciled with a physicalist framework (i.e. does it make any sense whatsoever to call these experiences "physical"?) To gain some insight into this point, it may help to know that Chalmers believes in the logical possibility of "zombies", which is to say things that are functionally and behaviorally identical to us in every respect, but which do not have subjective conscious experiences. There is nothing it is like to be a zombie. Searle's "weak AI" and Sophianic's "simulations" are really just another way of stating this intuition (the "zombic hunch"), as applied to computers in particular. Personally, I find that the concept of zombies is ridiculous enough that it can easily amount to a reductio ad absurdum of positions that allow for it, but I'll wait for a couple more replies before I explain why.

Chalmers' "hard problem" is this: why is the performance of computational functions by brains accompanied by conscious experience? To quote Chalmers, "What makes the hard problem hard and almost unique is that it goes beyond problems about the performance of functions. To see this, note that even when we have explained the performance of all the cognitive and behavioral functions in the vicinity of experience - perceptual discrimination, categorization, internal access, verbal report - there may still remain a further unanswered question: Why is the performance of these functions accompanied by experience? A simple explanation of the functions leaves this question open." Part of the solution (he says) must be to abandon physicalism and to adopt property dualism, where conscious experience is taken to be a fundamentally different sort of thing from, say, neurons or any possible interactions that they may have.

Incidentally, if I haven't made it clear yet, I lean much closer to Dennett's position than to Chalmers', so I don't want you to read me as arguing for Chalmers' case. However, while I understand what Chalmers is trying to say, and disagree, I am concerned that some people do not understand what he is trying to say, and disagree only because they vaguely perceive him as attacking some fundamental tenet of their larger worldview (as in "wtf, dualism?!").

Psychodelerium says:

However, while I understand what Chalmers is trying to say, and disagree, I am concerned that some people do not understand what he is trying to say, and disagree only because they vaguely perceive him as attacking some fundamental tenet of their larger worldview (as in "wtf, dualism?!").

I can't tell you how long and hard the search for people that are fundamentally interested in truth first and foremost has been. It is a pleasure to correspond over this issue if for no other reason then the sense of rational purpose people like you bring to it. I wish only to thank you and tell you how much I respect this regardless of whether we ever come to agree or dissagree on any particular point.

Your truly "philosophical" character did not escape my notice or respect.

This is the second time I have read Chalmer's paper. The first 90% strikes me as "zombic rambling"...Gibberish. The dude needs to be more concise. I think he gets to the heart of the matter when he discusses "patterns of information". He describes the information theory of consciousness as pure speculation at this point, however I think he dismisses this too quickly. Theoretical physics is slowly melding with information theory as a way to describe the world...ie. the "bit is it" theory of the universe.

Anyway, I have no reason to disbelieve that our subjective experience is purely a program. There is zero evidence of qualia. There has never been any evidence of a dual nature of minds. None. Zippo. Zero.

The complex problems of science always start out with mystical explanations. We develop better tools. We uncover the mysteries. We move onto the next mystery. The knee jerk response to explaining the tough problem of consciousness is to speculate that it is some sort of special "power" or "force", beyond our tools of discovery. Based purely on the history of scientific discovery, I guarantee that we will discover the complex program that is consciousness. The human brain, our neural networks, the EM topology (ref. Lazarus) of our thought patterns, is incredibly complex. It is beyond our current understanding but I guarantee it will not be beyond our future understanding. We will create a program that can "enjoy" (really subjectively enjoy) a cold one on the beach.

Now a thought experiment. Does everyone remember the fellow in England that had a computer circuit connected to a nerve in his wrist? His brain communicated with the silicon. These transistors were not conscious, but they were part of the guy's conscious experience. Now lets move on down the road a couple years and imagine a person with several integrated circuits in her body...bionic legs...hearing and sight implants...yada yada. You know where this is going. At what point is the person a machine. At what point do we say there is or isn't consciousness present. If the person is slowly and completely replaced with silicon (or whatever substrate does the job), without losing consciousness, are we going to say the person has lost their ability of conscious experience, just because the make-up of their body is not the normal cells, fluids, DNA we are all accustomed to.

I agree with Chalmer's that there is a hard problem of consciousness, however just because Chalmer's cannot figure out why conscious experience "comes along with" computational functions, does not mean that we cannot or will not figure this out. I don't see any need to speculate about dualism, or special forces/powers, whatever.

On the subject of simulation...If an artificially created being states that it is conscious and that it has conscious experiences, how can we prove it wrong? If the programming of the being is too complex for our understanding (like many programs in development or in existence today) how will we know? We will not know until we decode our own programming. What I am trying to get at...really...is that we cannot judge whether a complex program is able have subjective conscious experience until we first understand our own consciousness.

in my perspective, consciousness is the coding of the unconsiousness.

when I am consciously exhausting effort it is similar to writing a program. In a perfect world I would not need to be conscious at all. But since my programs are not pre-set for me, nor are they ever truley complete. I am at all times writing completly new programs or makeing changes and updates for new versions of old programs. When I first started driving, a lot of conscious effort was needed because it was a completely new program for me - but now that program is pretty well coded and is executed flaulessly without any concious effort on a daily basis. Every different car I drive requires a little bit of conscious coding, or a new version. And when I first drove a stick shift, it required a major new version update and a lot of consious coding.

I have currently been contemplating if it is possible for me to code a program for coding, or in other words, make a habbit of making habbits.

The "hard problem" so to speak, in my perspective, seems to be the paradox of having a program that can write programs. It doesn't seem possible but at the same time it seems like we are just that.

If we can figure that out we might not have to ever use concious thought again, but then, what would be the point?

does anybody know exactly what 'I' am because clearly whatever I am exists or I would not be able think about this etc. But if I am my brain then that does not appear to fit since my brain is always changing. and I am a number of unchanging links in my brain what would happen if there were more than 1 of these links exactly because i surely cannot be in more than 1 place at once and surely they cannot be 2 seperate me's because which one would be me? ???????

and how do I know for sure ( or how do you know for sure) that everyone else is really conscious surely they could just be things that 'react to stuff' in a conscoius like way

Over the past few days I have become fascinated with the "hard problem" of consciousness. In the past I was content to agree with Dennett and deny the phenomenon outright. However, the more I think about it, the more this problem bothers me. There most definitely is a phenomenon of experience. None of us can demonstrate that it exists objectively, yet we all know that it exists through our subjective experiences.

Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness
by David Chalmers

The easy problems of consciousness include those of explaining the following phenomena:

the ability to discriminate, categorize, and react to environmental stimuli;
the integration of information by a cognitive system;
the reportability of mental states;
the ability of a system to access its own internal states;
the focus of attention;
the deliberate control of behavior;
the difference between wakefulness and sleep.

The hard problem

Why doesn't all this information-processing go on "in the dark," free of any inner feel? Why is it that when electromagnetic waveforms impinge on a retina and are discriminated and categorized by a visual system, this discrimination and categorization is experienced as a sensation of vivid red? We know that conscious experience does arise when these functions are performed, but the very fact that it arises is the central mystery. There is an explanatory gap (a term due to Levine 1983) between the functions and experience, and we need an explanatory bridge to cross it. A mere account of the functions stays on one side of the gap, so the materials for the bridge must be found elsewhere.

The inability to explain experience is a (major?) deficiency in the materialist world view. This is not to say that the tenents of cartesian dualism (or the belief in an eternal soul that operates on a different plain from the cognitive functioning of the mind) is superior to materialism. Far from it, dualism offers a superficial solution that can not be proven objectively.

I for one, would rather admit to not having any specific knowledge on the matter and be content to continue pondering the mystery. Unfortunately, the large majority of humankind abhors inconclusiveness and would rather place their "faith" in unsubstantiated claims. Hence, if we have any chance of replacing the current orthodoxy we must solve the hard problem of consciousness.

Slowly I am beginning to understand why concepts such as "mass consciousness" or "universal consciousness" are so appealing to some of my fellow materialists. However, such concepts are still, technically, a form of dualism, unsupported by objective means. (Here, I admit that I am on shaky ground, and this opinion is in actuality nothing more than a supposition. By all means, try to convince me otherwise. I am completely open minded on the subject. )

Of course, by taking experience as fundamental, there is a sense in which this approach does not tell us why there is experience in the first place. But this is the same for any fundamental theory. Nothing in physics tells us why there is matter in the first place, but we do not count this against theories of matter. Certain features of the world need to be taken as fundamental by any scientific theory. A theory of matter can still explain all sorts of facts about matter, by showing how they are consequences of the basic laws. The same goes for a theory of experience.

This position qualifies as a variety of dualism, as it postulates basic properties over and above the properties invoked by physics. But it is an innocent version of dualism, entirely compatible with the scientific view of the world. Nothing in this approach contradicts anything in physical theory; we simply need to add further bridging principles to explain how experience arises from physical processes. There is nothing particularly spiritual or mystical about this theory - its overall shape is like that of a physical theory, with a few fundamental entities connected by fundamental laws. It expands the ontology slightly, to be sure, but Maxwell did the same thing. Indeed, the overall structure of this position is entirely naturalistic, allowing that ultimately the universe comes down to a network of basic entities obeying simple laws, and allowing that there may ultimately be a theory of consciousness cast in terms of such laws. If the position is to have a name, a good choice might be naturalistic dualism.

I also find the concept of consciousness being a fundamental aspect of the universe (along with gravity, matter, space, time, etc) as worthy of more thought. Could the answer to the hard problem of consciousness lie in physics. I don't know. As Chalmer points out, we still can't explain the existence of other fundamentals such as time or matter. Yet somehow the issue of consciousness seems more urgent than other fundamentals.

Agreed, it strikes me that some of the respondents are missing the point.

Yes, and maybe this is also the reason that they have a hard time understanding why some Immortalists have their doubts about Strong AI and a Singularity. (Please keep in mind that I am not suggesting that consciousness must necessarily be confined to a biological substrate. I am simply saying that I am not entirely confident that we can create a conscious entity when we still have a hard time defining exactly what consciousness is. And even if we did think that we had created a sentient being, how could we objectively prove that we had done so? How could we be sure that we wouldn't be populating the world with "zombic" AI? Or maybe my concerns represent my going into erroneous and unwarrented complexity? Afterall, we can not prove objectively that other humans are truly consciousness, why must we hold AI to a higher standard? Kurzweil comes to mind when he says, "...when the machines claim to be conscious, we will believe them." Maybe that will be enough.

I wish I had spotted this thread earlier as I had created a thread in the philosophy section related to the hard question of consciousness, only to find a nearly identitical thread located here. Oh well [wis] , if a navigator wishes to delete my other thread they may do so as I guess my thoughts expressed there were... late and repetitive. Sorry about that. [cry]


DonS

I have not had time to read the articles, although I would love to do so, however I am a dualist. Dennett's philosophy frustrates me so much because not only is he lazy but he obviously is intelligent enough to correct himself.

Off the top of my head, just conceive of the world in which all of your color perceptions are inverted. You see normally blue objects as red and normally red objects as blue and so on. Now ask yourself the question of whether or not you could distinguish this world from the normal world by examining the physical matter, from planets to subatomic particles, at all. Can you even know whether or not other human beings experience colors exactly as you do? You cannot (although Occam's Razor and the law of causality provide strong reasons for doing so). Moreover, this subjective experience of colors and others perceptions/qualia is the ONLY means we have of inferring knowledge about the exterior world.

I wish I had spotted this thread earlier as I had created a thread in the philosophy section related to the hard question of consciousness, only to find a nearly identitical thread located here. Oh well  , if a navigator wishes to delete my other thread they may do so as I guess my thoughts expressed there were... late and repetitive. Sorry about that.

There is nothing to apologize for Don. I almost mentioned it to you when I read the other thread but as I didn't relish the idea of going searching at that moment for this one I waited until I had a chance to find it. Well there you go and find it yourself, highly efficient.

What I would gladly do if it doesn't offend you is merge the threads as coincidently enough I thought your post was highly appropriate to this thread and did in fact belong here. Is that a satisfactory action?

I hope so because if you look up you will see that your post from the other thread is now here (where it belongs). [lol]

So as I just merged your former self with your new self do you feel any different?

I did expunge the new identity in favor of the old though and I am not sure how progressive that was but I do think continuity was preserved )

Also I would like to link the discussion I started on DNA & Platonic Forms with this one because I detect a profound overlap of not just theme but substance.

You see when I say DNA is both code and component it invokes a very similar dilemma to the one we are attempting to resolve between the dualism and materialism. Well guess what saying DNA is both code and component is dualism.

Now try and separate the two. DNA is the code, deny it and see how far you get but it is literally the substantive building block of all your flesh, go ahead I dare you all to to deny it. Well as I contemplated the character of self assembling molecules I ran into Plato first and then guess who, Penrose who makes the same extrapolation for subatomic particles. Well now we have a resonate parallel principle that does seem to be invoking a very similar result with respect to possible behavioral laws governing material existence.

Wheew, it would have been nice if a purely material explanation made this duality disappear but the conundrum is that it is the very material explanation that invokes the dual perception by an empirically available substance (DNA) for study that possesses a dual character that is also the principle constituent of both code and component of our brains and more importantly our psyches. So now you have an empirical reason to address dualism. Our brains are made of smart molecules of DNA and it is both code and component of a complex organ that is demonstrated to be working on levels above and below the conscious. You are all familiar with the idea of the sub-conscious? Well maybe someone else's if not your own )

Well many of us have argued that as social creatures humans are also in possession of a super conscience and this is a disturbing invocation of dualism as most people understand the dilemma posed but so what?

This isn't about what we want to be true, it is about seeking an objective and empirically verifiable perspective of what is true. The sub-conscience has a reasonable body of evidence to support its existence and the super consciousness as society is also obvious but how deep in either direction can we go?

I have long suspected that when most people are seeing God what they are recognizing is our species Super-Consciousness staring them back in the face. This doesn't answer the real theological question one way or another because I am suggesting the idea of a super consciousness is a material consequence of the encryption and design of it encoded in our DNA.

Or perhaps you want to argue something like creationism? We are social primates people not some individual creation independent of all other creatures so as social primates we didn't invent being social though we are taking it to another plane of being.

In other words being social is in our genes and what strikes me as reduction to absurdity is the attempt by materialists to reduce the argument to a level that becomes almost solipsistic in the attempt to explain reality.

Oh yeah that is right DNA is alive, correct?

Wrong, DNA (by itself) is not alive or we return to the conundrum of viruses. So what character of DNA must be stimulated? What force is added to define what DNA is doing as alive versus simply being complex code with no being?

Oh that is right there is no life force we detect with EM but the reason I return the discussion to Plato is what if the reason is that we have a flawed definition of energy that is incomplete?

In other words what if we are looking in the wrong place for life force?

This comparative analysis of Plato's forms forces a return to arguments that have been conducted by humans since we captured fire and divided up the hunt. The part that is semantic and built into the language as both Universal lexicon and an idea wound up with our own definitions of perception is the "Power of Ideas".

What constitutes such an energy form and how would it be measured?

Is this a return to mythology or the beginning of memology?

The reason materialists have a hard time with this is that we are learning the power of code and programming as we develop ever more "powerful software" that uses the "logic as a force" to operate machines and provide an extended Will to the user as a tool.

A Concept is an 'energy form' in exactly the way we say "knowledge is power" and this is the nexus of the dualist position that until now has lacked a coherent perspective allowing it to be distinguished from how we normally manipulate energy, which is limited to the more tangible aspects of the phenomenon. But knowledge is itself spiritual by definition and without code (language, symbols, algorithms, or some such FORM) has no material expression whatsoever, well until we see some funny things going on at the subatomic level and then low and behold again at the level of DNA.

Is this a proof of God's existence?

I have no way of proving such a statement one way or another and I find such statements a distraction from more important analysis. Ask instead: Is this approach opening up a more serious and pragmatic discussion of what constitutes a duality of mind/brain and body with spirit?

Yes I suggest it is and now how would we define the power of knowledge and the "WILL" as "Life Force"?

I think we are not going to find it on the EM spectrum so let's try looking elsewhere. When I do I return to seeing all of you in relation to myself and all of us in relation to all life as we know it. We are the spectrum and this is when the topic overlaps spirituality.

Are you uncomfortable with that idea?

Perhaps the problem is psychological more than social though we seem to have that problem too as a species, Stare into the eyes of the beast and before you see yourself understand that this is the interface of social and physical science. It is also how the concept of understanding genetics will unleash nanotechnology in a scale and scope unforeseen still as the rules governing genetics probably have a correlating set of laws that are in place at the subatomic as well.

These are however soluble problems and I am confident that we can build on this knowledge with the addition of an idea, the creative force of love.

I know how trite it sounds but think about it physically, love attracts and hate repels. Is Dark Force Energy that is ripping reality apart reflecting a lack of love in the Universe?

Perhaps as we learn to truly love, what I term the "Will to Love" we can even balance the expanding Universe and bring about a Universal Ecology that is life sustaining ad infinitum. I know many of you hate this idea as spiritual but at least thinking about it can be fun. [alien] [!]

As for the overlap this topic bears with respect to uploading this great link was just shared with me by the Meta-brain consciousness of Nexus Machine )

http://www.aleph.se/...obal/Uploading/

And just on time too!

Wouldn't you just know that the page was made by Anders Sandberg asa@nada.kth.se

Enjoy it everyone!

Can you even know whether or not other human beings experience colors exactly as you do?  You cannot (although Occam's Razor and the law of causality provide strong reasons for doing so).  Moreover, this subjective experience of colors and others perceptions/qualia is the ONLY means we have of inferring knowledge about the exterior world.

Indeed JD. In fact I used this exact thought experiment to convey the idea of "experience" to a good friend of mine. After a bit of initial confusion she grasped the idea I was trying to convey. The concept of experience, once you " get it", makes a lot of other concepts related to consciousness easier to deal with.

And I also agree with you that some one of Dennett's calibur is obviously aware of this hard problem of consciousness. Yet, in everything I have read by him he seems to choose the option of ignoring it. This alone makes me leary when dealing with Dennett. I wouldn't go so far as to accuse him of being intellectual dishonest (as I am not an expert in the field of cognitive science or matters of consciousness), but I do think that he is such a hard core materialist that he is unwilling to admit the weaknesses is his perspective.

This to me, is a "mortal sin" when committed by a fellow rationalist, as it is abiding by dogma and consequently tainting scientific inquiry. But hey, that's just my opinion, I could be wrong (Dennis Miller reference )

As I said above, naturalistic dualism, which I have only recently begun to seriously consider, has some appeal to me. Considering consciousness (or experience...I guess the phrasing would be a matter of semantics?) as one of the fundamentals of the universe, along with time, matter, etc, seems to be a good way of reconciling the "hard problem" for now, as it seems the answer will not be coming anytime soon.

Nice to dialog with you again, it's been a while.

DonS

Edited by DonSpanton, 12 January 2004 - 06:28 AM.

What a great thread...I'm fascinated with consciousness, I tend to believe that through subconscious processes a great deal of coding does go on in our brains, however I'm skeptical as to the degree that this happens. From the little that I read it seems that Chalmer likes to go into great detail in trying to figure out this baffling question. He can understand what the brain does just not how it does what it does so well. It seems that the algorithms responsible for consciousness have not been found yet nor has there been a satisfactory answer to the nature of what experiences are. Are they just electro chemical manifesations of our synapses and neurons sending signals back and forth or is there 'something more to it!' However back to the other thread on DNA that Lazarus started it is interesting to note that our DNA is essentialy a code formed from proteins that act as a complex set of ingrained memories unlike symbolic language? (didn't quite get that.)

I don't believe in a soul or a spirit but the neurons in our brain certainly trick us into thinking we have one. I see this problem as being solved fairly soon because our brains are wetware that are composed of several different sections we are not that complex. I also believe other animals have consiousness as well. I would leave it up to nanotechnology to make improvements on our brains as I think that would make our experiences alot more interesting. As for the philosophy end of the picture I would have to say I'm a materialist with dualist ideals!

...note that our DNA is essentially a code formed from proteins that act as a complex set of ingrained memories unlike symbolic language? (didn't quite get that.)

Because the code in this case is not symbolic but actual, sort of like 'analog' as opposed to digital. Consider the way an old record is the actual waveform of sound and the digital is a mathematical description of the sound. This is a flawed comparison, and an imprecise metaphor but the codes are not symbols they are the 'thing itself'. So much so that the code assembles itself into the expression of the 'code' as specialized flesh.

Unlike the letter 'A,' which "represents" a sound and the number "one" (1), which is a conceptual (symbol) object depicting quantity, in the case of DNA what you see is what you get. The gene is an expression of an ear, not as a symbol but as an essential form. Even in the case of hieroglyphs the picture is always symbolic and we tend to always imagine code in this same detached (conceptual) manner but I am unable to find such an abstract division in the analysis of how DNA encodes information.

It is when a simple observation like that emanates from philosophy that you enter the true realm of science. As someone else here often has said, "prove me wrong". When such simple observations of ideas that has been in discussion for thousands of years (Plato's Form) yet never directly perceived are found staring you in the face that we can get a little excited about discovery but now comes the tests, first of the idea and then of the actual state this perspective would suggest.

The kind of dualism I am suggesting is not mystical but it contains elements that some might want to take too far. I am not doing so but I am asking to re-examine an idea thought irrelevant as it may have an important understanding for the rules governing the behavior of matter.

The importance when talking about "life" is that DNA even at the molecular level is not just any chemical but a "smart molecule". When we take a purely materialistic view to this we are not seeing the whole picture. We we say it is code at this level it is not code for some other "thing" it is a code (a blueprint) for what itself becomes when you add up a lot of itself. Hence not simply brick & blocks into the building but a blueprint of a building that makes a building out of lots of copies of the blueprints.

Symbolic logic models fail to accurately describe this condition as well as the Platonic model does. Think of an old player piano roll making music on a player piano and then conceive of a bunch of player piano rolls unraveling and reorganizing themselves INTO a player piano so as to read the rolls and make more of them all the while doing so playing the music the rolls contain. DNA is a living song, form not just symbolic of form, yet even more as an 'essential form' the way a blueprint is understood to contain all the necessary information for building a building encrypted onto the object. Does this address the confusion better?

The overlap is that something is also going on with the way neural network of DNA is involved with actually coding memory as the brain (a DNA computer) and this is where the "symbolic" aspects of such encryption are not a very good way of looking at the situation as this is filtered memory. We 'select' information from our vast stock of it to make the applications task specific but we possibly 'remember' everything all the time and theoretically if that level of memory were active instead of passive then you could find yourself reliving an experience with almost no way to distinguish memory from present experience.

This is the aspect of uploading issue for example that may be problematic for as we access memory and do so to preserve "in total" the person then the dilemma of access and how to filter data flow so as to remain sane will also emerge. Artificial enhancement of our minds will allow for eidetic memories long before uploading is fully achieved. Are you ready to remember everything all the time and in far more detail then you have ever imagined possible?

When I am talking about the brain as a DNA computer of applied Platonic form I am describing basic elements of a model as logical constructs that have repercussions for how we will come to understand the brain/mind balance of form and function. It should be obvious that this needs to be done first before any major breakthrough of kinds we anticipate are possible.

You see invoking a model of the brain/mind is itself dualism, but arguing that in this case form and function are one and the same analogous to a Platonic Form is very much like what empirical materialists are saying we should expect to see, and do.

Psychodelerium makes exactly the point I was roundly criticized by stating the conjecture that there is an extrasomatic component to the mind when he speaks of "something beyond neurons".

And Michael, with much respect, the fact that you "don’t believe in qualia" contradicts itself. Your belief is a qualia in itself a quality! That that belief is composed of weighed quantities, viz there are more arguments for than against (in your opinion), still does not allow the final subjective experience of your belief to escape the qualifications of what is essentially an opinion. That you think you girlfriend is "sexy" and your mother is "great" could be put down to biological imperatives that are the result of weighted arguments, but still your fundamental experience of them is a quality. That my stomach is full or empty is the result of the quantity of the food I have eaten, that a meal tastes good to me is a quality. Trust me, I have been in a position before to put food in my belly that I could hardly stand to swallow, and so overcame quality to satisfy quantity.

I don’t think the question is why are these functions accompanied by experience, but rather why is experience accompanied by all these functions? A starving man may still find joy in poetry, accounts abound (Ellie Weisel’s Night) of German concentration camp victims finding the strength to endure by the joy of writing and listening to poetry. Conversely, a wealthy man can throw himself from a rooftop.

I'd imagine that our consiousness is either a function of how our brain is constructed (a way of reviewing information or something), or something that naturally arises from our "programming", like the greater the span of observation and action (etc), the more "consciouss" an intelligent system becomes.