Who You Were On Your Second Birthday

You have changed much over the years. You are now much different from what you were on your second birthday. Suppose a copy could be made of what you physically were at a precise moment on your second birthday to atomic scale accuracy. Neither your present self nor the copy would actually be who you were on your second birthday. However, which of the two would be closer to who you were on your second birthday?

I voted for my "second birthday copy", because my current self has no memory of what I was like at 2 years old. All of my memories from that long ago have been overwritten or vanished. If the copy had atomic scale precision then I assume it's brain would have those memories from my early years and thus would be closer to my original self at 2 years old.

I voted for "my present self". Me at my second birthday was still me. My second birthday copy would be someone else.

I will not vote pending more discussion.

However I will say that if this copy was made and did not age with me, then technically the copy would be closer to who I was on my second birthday. This position coming from the point of a remote observer though.

You did not ask this question but I will respond anyway, as to whether the copy is me just as much as the original. To that I would say that once you have made a copy, you have divergence of consciousness even at the exact point of replication they have seperate consciousness. Both individuals would initially think they are the original but the duplicate will realize the shift of location from where the original was standing to the point where the the duplicate appears and likely realize he/she is the copy. Suffice it to say there are ways of mangling this example so as to make the argument more difficult, but accordingly there are more complicated reasons for why duplicates are not the same (or a direct continuation) as originals in the position of the originals themselves. Granted remote observers would not be the wiser. Of course this is an argument for another debate. I won't hijack your thread.

I voted for "my present self".  Me at my second birthday was still me.  My second birthday copy would be someone else.

The identity of a musical tune is not preserved by continuity but by symbolic representation and duplication. The identity of a hydrogen atom is preserved by physical continuity of its nucleus, but no chemical process cares whether it uses one hydrogen atom or another. Two different atoms of the same element can become perfectly identical by means of quantum entanglement. A dead skeleton is physically continuous with a formerly living person but does not preserve the properties of personal identity that are most vital to the person.

Could someone provide a clear logical explanation as to why physical continuity is the only means by which the properties of personal identity that are of most vital interest to us can be preserved? How does physical continuity, which permits radical changes in physcial form, memories, and personality, accomplish what atomic precision duplication cannot do in this regard?

I will not vote pending more discussion.

You did not ask this question but I will respond anyway, as to whether the copy is me just as much as the original. To that I would say that once you have made a copy, you have divergence of consciousness even at the exact point of replication they have seperate consciousness.

Could it not also be said that the consciousness of a single, physically continuous person continually diverges from its past self?

Could someone provide a clear logical explanation as to why physical continuity is the only means by which the properties of personal identity that are of most vital interest to us can be preserved? How does physical continuity, which permits radical changes in physcial form, memories, and personality, accomplish what atomic precision duplication cannot do in this regard?

That's simple. Both myself and my copy could exist at the same moment. Thus they would be two separate entities. Now, if you were to destroy the original me at the same moment creating this copy, the rest of the world wouldn't care too much. But I would (assuming I was capable of caring), because I would be dead.

Now this might be preferable if at some point I did have to die(for whatever reason). Though I would be dead, a child of my mind would exist.

Cliff, it would be helpful to point us to the same references or thought procedure you use in coming up with your philosophy of mind. To my knowledge, the implicit issue here is still controversial, where no brilliance exists in one camp more than another. To go about developing a philosophy of mind, first a mind would have to give a damn. Then, the mind would need to work through the steps in gradually interfacing with computers or implanting neurochips, and decide for itself along the way whether it’s losing its identity (and even then, no other mind can genuinely take that mind’s word for it). With current technology, one mind is able to observe the chemical processes of another mind but is not able to observe the actual experiences of the other mind. What constitutes this gap? How should this gap be closed? No one knows; the experiments don’t exist.

What it’s going to come down to is that no mind will ever have the privilege developing a philosophy of mind that would apply to any mind other than its own. Each mind should be provided the liberty to decide whether it should take a chance with its own perceived identity. There are likely not to be any certainties (at least not certainties that can be imposed) in this area anytime before the appropriate technology exists. Therefore, act according to your beliefs and don’t presume that your perceived insights are relevant to other minds.

Could someone provide a clear logical explanation as to why physical continuity is the only means by which the properties of personal identity that are of most vital interest to us can be preserved? How does physical continuity, which permits radical changes in physcial form, memories, and personality, accomplish what atomic precision duplication cannot do in this regard?

That's simple. Both myself and my copy could exist at the same moment. Thus they would be two separate entities. Now, if you were to destroy the original me at the same moment creating this copy, the rest of the world wouldn't care too much. But I would (assuming I was capable of caring), because I would be dead.

Now this might be preferable if at some point I did have to die(for whatever reason). Though I would be dead, a child of my mind would exist.

A dead person is not capable of caring about anything. A living person can care about his impending death. The duplicate can care that the original is gone. However, the duplicate may observe he clearly remembers his past and become fully convinced that he is the original.

Could you say that the present you is the child of the past you? Should a person be in constant mourning over the loss of his past self? Should a person live in constant fear of the impending loss of his present self?

Clifford Greenblatt: However, the duplicate may observe he clearly remembers his past and become fully convinced that he is the original.

Invalid.

Before it is assumed that my attempt to refute is bias-inspired, I shall express that I am personally willing to take radical chances with my core identity as the opportunity presents itself.

In regards to the above statement, it doesn’t follow that the duplicate would become fully convinced that he is the original just because he remembers his past. If he is cognizant that the technology exists to make copies of individuals, memories and all, he would be fully capable of recognizing that he is only a duplicate, with the same memories as an original, who happens to have also a sense of self in unique spacetime.

The self of the original is a series of events which consist of existent passing moments at the age of two and the existent passing moments of its present self. These events have a uniquely particular relationship in spacetime, and the original can in principle know this. The self of the duplicate is a series of events which consist of existent passing moments when it was first materialized and the existent passing moments of its present self. These events are connected in spacetime, while the event of the duplicate’s present self doesn’t have the same relationship in spacetime to any existents of the original’s series of events as the original has, and the duplicate can in principle know this.

If the duplicate can know he's a duplicate, then he accepts he's a duplicate. If he accepts he's a duplicate, then he's not fully convinced that he's the original.

Cliff, it would be helpful to point us to the same references or thought procedure you use in coming up with your philosophy of mind. To my knowledge, the implicit issue here is still controversial, where no brilliance exists in one camp more than another. To go about developing a philosophy of mind, first a mind would have to give a damn. Then, the mind would need to work through the steps in gradually interfacing with computers or implanting neurochips, and decide for itself along the way whether it’s losing its identity (and even then, no other mind can genuinely take that mind’s word for it). With current technology, one mind is able to observe the chemical processes of another mind but is not able to observe the actual experiences of the other mind. What constitutes this gap? How should this gap be closed? No one knows; the experiments don’t exist.

What it’s going to come down to is that no mind will ever have the privilege developing a philosophy of mind that would apply to any mind other than its own. Each mind should be provided the liberty to decide whether it should take a chance with its own perceived identity. There are likely not to be any certainties (at least not certainties that can be imposed) in this area anytime before the appropriate technology exists. Therefore, act according to your beliefs and don’t presume that your perceived insights are relevant to other minds.

In my philosophy of the mind, sentience involves a reality that transcends physical processes. However, I have not been successful in arguing this position logically because a scientific view of reality seems to require nothing beyond physical processes. The most I can argue is that physical processes are guided by transcendent laws which are not themselves physical processes.

Not being able to argue scientifically about reality that transcends physical processes, I am limiting myself to discussing personal identity with those who believe that reality is limited to physical processes. If reality is limited to physical processes, then I do not see how a physical duplicate of a person could possibly fail to contain all the properties that are vital to the person's interests. The story is far different if there is reality that transcends physical processes. Then, physical duplication may not be adequate to preserve all the properties that are essential to a person's vital interests.

Clifford Greenblatt: The most I can argue is that physical processes are guided by transcendent laws which are not themselves physical processes.

I don’t presume that it’s impossible for me to agree with you here, but at this time I believe that reality consists of nothing that transcends physics. If there are gaps in our present model of physics, then the unknowns don’t transcend physics; they are simply incomprehensible given our present model of physics. If faeries actually do exist, they don’t transcend physics; our model is merely deficient.

If reality is limited to physical processes, then I do not see how a physical duplicate of a person could possibly fail to contain all the properties that are vital to the person's interests.

You’ve responded to my first post in this thread, so it is unclear to me whether you read my second post in this thread. In my second post, I believe that I may have adequately provided a means so you could see how a physical duplicate of a person could fail to contain all the properties that are vital to his interests. (Here, I must assume that, by “interests,” you mean his belief that he is the original. Otherwise, you would be making an assumption that doesn’t apply to your original argument, namely that a duplicate would necessarily be offended for no other reason than for the fact he’s a duplicate.)

My second post suggests that the properties the duplicate would fail to have would include the property “the series of events that are uniquely particular in spacetime to the original self.” We have no justification to assume that existent events and time play no role in a particular mind’s core identity.

… physical duplication may not be adequate to preserve all the properties that are essential to a person's vital interests.

I must admit that your presentation up to this point doesn’t seem to suggest what you say here. But it is your complete impartiality that confused me rather than any deficiency in your presentation.

Taken what has been said, in a certain sense (since “closer” is used ambiguously), the present self is closer related to its two-year-old self than is the two-year-old duplicate.

The present self is an event that is uniquely linked in spacetime to the event when it turned two. The present self’s actual Self is a series of events that can’t be spatio-temporally copied with absolute precision. Only compositional congruency is logically feasible.

If one can accept that Self is the set of a specific series of actual events subjectively experienced by a sentient being, and any member that is a part of this set is closer related to each other than members outside this set, then one necessarily accepts that the present self (a member of the set Self) is closer related to its actual two-year-old self (another member of the set Self) than any member outside this set (e.g., the member “two-year-old duplicate”).

Taken what has been said, in a certain sense (since “closer” is used ambiguously), the present self is closer related to its two-year-old self than is the two-year-old duplicate.

The present self is an event that is uniquely linked in spacetime to the event when it turned two. The present self’s actual Self is a series of events that can’t be spatio-temporally copied with absolute precision. Only compositional congruency is logically feasible.

If one can accept that Self is the set of a specific series of actual events subjectively experienced by a sentient being, and any member that is a part of this set is closer related to each other than members outside this set, then one necessarily accepts that the present self (a member of the set Self) is closer related to its actual two-year-old self (another member of the set Self) than any member outside this set (e.g., the member “two-year-old duplicate”).

Physical continuity does give an object an identity that cannot be shared by any object that is not physically continuous with it. However, the issue I present is that of whether a duplicate posesses all the properties that fulfill the full purpose of the original. The first dollar bill that a shop owner received in his business cannot be replaced by another in his framed display because it would lack the sentimental value of the original. OTOH, a new muffler on a car fulfills the purpose of an old, worn out muffler much better than the original. A lifeless skeleton is physically continuous with the original living person, but would it fulfill the purpose of preserving the most vita properties of personhood better than a living duplicate?

Here is another interesting question. Suppose a person's mind could divide into two minds. This may have actually been done in past cases of epileptics who had had surgery done to separate the two hemispheres of their brains. Which of the minds would be the original?

Clifford Greenblatt: However, the issue I present is that of whether a duplicate posesses all the properties that fulfill the full purpose of the original.

“Full purpose” has no meaning. The original and the duplicate have distinct natures, and these natures can be known (again, as I’ve outlined in my second post in this thread). For some reason you place more value on the arbitrary notion “full purpose” than on their actual natures – the natures of which can be known to them and influence their self-affirmations.

A lifeless skeleton is physically continuous with the original living person, but would it fulfill the purpose of preserving the most vita properties of personhood better than a living duplicate?

Again: We have no justification to assume that existent events and time play no role in a particular mind’s core identity.

I will not vote pending more discussion.

You did not ask this question but I will respond anyway, as to whether the copy is me just as much as the original. To that I would say that once you have made a copy, you have divergence of consciousness even at the exact point of replication they have seperate consciousness.

Could it not also be said that the consciousness of a single, physically continuous person continually diverges from its past self?

Yes it could be said, but the nature of that divergence is different. There is a gradual change in the consciousness as you grow up, you become aware of more things, and as your cognitive faculties expand you're able to grasp more notions.

In the cessation of one consciousness and the beginning of another at the point of duplication, there is a disconnect, something a remote observer may not notice, but something the original individual would know to be true by virtue of the fact he/she would cease to exist.

I know we did have a conversation about a little while ago.

edit: this post was delayed a few days because of internet problems (no internet for a few days)

In the cessation of one consciousness and the beginning of another at the point of duplication, there is a disconnect, something a remote observer may not notice, but something the original individual would know to be true by virtue of the fact he/she would cease to exist.

How could a nonexistent person know that he/she no longer exists? The duplicate may know this by being informed of such. Without being informed, the duplicate would have no way of knowing the he/she is not the original.

“Full purpose” has no meaning. The original and the duplicate have distinct natures, and these natures can be known (again, as I’ve outlined in my second post in this thread). For some reason you place more value on the arbitrary notion “full purpose” than on their actual natures – the natures of which can be known to them and influence their self-affirmations.

Some time ago, you presented a comprehensive list of personal values. Suppose you are in a deep and dreamless sleep one night. At that time, you are replaced in your bed with an atomic precision duplicate of yourself. Niether the duplicate nor anyone else who will ever communicate with him is ever informed of the switch. How much would the duplicate differ from you in the pursuit and further development of your values?

Again: We have no justification to assume that existent events and time play no role in a particular mind’s core identity.

I agree that physical continuity does give every physical entity a unique identity. My isssue is that of whether physical continuity is the exclusive means of preserving the core identity of the person. If an oxygen atom is bonded with two hydrogen atoms it gains the identity of being the oxygen atom of a water molecule. If another oxygen atom replaces it in the water molecule and it combines with a carbon monoxide molecule, then it has not lost its identity as the oxygen atom in a water molecule and has gained a new identity as an oxygen atom within a carbon dioxide molecule. It retains its identity as being a particular oxygen atom, but the other oxygen atom has fully taken its place in its functional identity.

In the cessation of one consciousness and the beginning of another at the point of duplication, there is a disconnect, something a remote observer may not notice, but something the original individual would know to be true by virtue of the fact he/she would cease to exist.

How could a nonexistent person know that he/she no longer exists? The duplicate may know this by being informed of such. Without being informed, the duplicate would have no way of knowing the he/she is not the original.

True. What I meant to say in retrospect is that the original being would know before his destruction that he would cease to exist regardless of whether or not he has a duplicate.

Furthermore, a duplicate cannot exist in the same location and time period as the original. There has to be some change of position and/or time from the point of destruction of the original to the creation of the duplicate. Perhaps you can fool the duplicate into thinking he/she is the original but the aforementioned still holds true.

I know we've had this discussion before. I believe it was you that brought up the issue of lack of continuity of consciousness and local space time continuity.

Some time ago, you presented a comprehensive list of personal values. Suppose you are in a deep and dreamless sleep one night. At that time, you are replaced in your bed with an atomic precision duplicate of yourself. Niether the duplicate nor anyone else who will ever communicate with him is ever informed of the switch. How much would the duplicate differ from you in the pursuit and further development of your values?

If neither the original was given any warning about its impending doom nor the duplicate was provided knowledge about its actual history (which began at materialization), then neither, from their own subjective viewpoints, could know their actual identity. Their actual identities, respectively, in our hypothetical case are a series of events from birth till death and a series of events from materialization till indefinitely. However, and as I think cosmos pointed out, an independent observer could, in principle, know their actual natures. Since there is a possible world where/when an independent observer can know their true natures in terms of actual events, this is good enough to suggest that it is still uncertain whether what-it-is-like to be the original is subjectively different than what-it-is-like to be the duplicate. Given the conditions that make this an uncertainty, namely that we can imagine a possible world where/when there is an independent observer and therefore what-it-is-likeness is an abstracted mystery, I modestly propose that at this time minds can only say they are taking a risk if they assign a truth value to “what-it-is-likeness is copyable.”

Does anyone reading this think they can assign a truth value with certainty to “what-it-is-likeness is copyable”? It would be interesting to know, and for what reasons. (Here, “what-it-is-like” does not mean having the same memories, intellectual potential, and embodiment; it means the unique sense of self independent of all these other properties.)

I agree that physical continuity does give every physical entity a unique identity. My isssue is that of whether physical continuity is the exclusive means of preserving the core identity of the person. If an oxygen atom is bonded with two hydrogen atoms it gains the identity of being the oxygen atom of a water molecule. If another oxygen atom replaces it in the water molecule and it combines with a carbon monoxide molecule, then it has not lost its identity as the oxygen atom in a water molecule and has gained a new identity as an oxygen atom within a carbon dioxide molecule. It retains its identity as being a particular oxygen atom, but the other oxygen atom has fully taken its place in its functional identity.

Yes, this is an issue – one that I believe is up to each functional mind to solve for itself. During this period in time, if a mind does not desire being duplicated because of the known risk, then such a mind should take steps to avoid duplication. And if a mind does desire being duplicated regardless of the known risk, then such a mind should take steps to become duplicated.

What is key, no mind can ever know for certain its actual identity. Therefore, minds, during this period in time (before the appropriate experiments are made available), need not philosophize about the actual truth value to “what-it-is-likeness is copyable,” because it is futile. What minds can do, however, is know that, via abstracting an independent observer in a possible world, the actual truth value to “what-it-is-likeness is copyable” cannot be known with certainty. In taking this knowledge of uncertainty, each functional mind can informatively assign, for itself, a value to duplication (or similar notions). To illustrate, I place zero value on duplication, because with my current limited knowledge and intelligence level, I am more inclined to believe that "what-it-is-likeness is copyable" is false. On the other hand, I do place non-zero value on brain-computer interfacing, because, again, with my current limited knowledge and intelligence level, I am more inclined to believe that I will preserve what-it-is-like to be me if I gradually allow my actual brain composition (original elements) to integrate with foreign composites.

Duplication of person is quite different from the gradual transmission of consciousness and memories. It is not inconcievable to have a situation where the entirety of consciousness is transferred into another host gradually, a host (be it artificial or not) that is capable of accepting such consciousness and will contain all the memories and experiences of the previous brain of which the consciousness was originally facilitated. If done correctly we may be able to retain a continuity of consciousness throughout the procedure.

Here is an example.
X = original brain, original facilitator of consciousness (a)
Y = new host, compatible host for consciousness (a)

Initially: X exists with consciousness (a)
Step 1: X and Y are slowly interconnected while they remain physically seperate, (a) accordingly is facilitated by both hosts
Step 2: Once again slowly, activity in host X is supressed physically, accordingly activity in Y may increase to compensate. During this procedure the patient is monitored and provides subjective input as to the progress and potential problems.
Step 3: At such point as activity in X has ceased, which could take quite some time, one assesses activity in Y. If deemed normal or acceptable (by whatever standards applied), former host X has it's link to Y slowed severed.

This is a crude example, and it likely faces many practical challenges. Despite that though, I see it as a preferable alternative to duplication or conventional uploading, as of yet.

Edited by cosmos, 26 October 2004 - 11:51 PM.

Which one is closer to who you were?

What is the "you" being referred to in the question? If "you" is the physical makeup of the body which eventually became the body that is typing this, then obviously the 2nd year copy is closer. From a materialist view this is the only thing I (this body) could imagine "you" being. If "you" is some other thing that somehow continued in the changing sequence of bodies that gave way to the body that is typing, then this definition seems somewhat magical and lacks any evidence as far as I (this body) can see.

Does physical continuity really have a better chance of preserving "what-it-is likeness" than atomic precision duplication? The irony is that physical continuity permits radical changes in physical form, memories, and personality over time. We know that a lifeless skeleton does not preserve "what-it-is-likeness" despite being physically continuous with a formerly living person. Perhaps physical continuity preserves "what-it-is-likeness" for only short periods of time. The unbroken chain of short term continuity in "what-it-is-likeness" could give an illusion of long term preservation of "what-it-is-likeness." Unless "what-it-is-likeness" can be defined in scientifically useful terms, we would have no scentific means of answering the question.

I find core identity to be very real and yet very elusive to define. Here are some personal observations about it.

1. It either is or is most closely associated with stream of consciousness.

2. My memory informs me that my core identity has been a constant for as much of my life as I can remember. I rely on my memory for historical events and therefore trust it regarding permanence of core identity.

3.The stream of consciousness is not continuous. It is interrupted by deep and dreamless sleep. However, core identity appears unaltered when the stream of consciousness is resumed.

4. Core identity is intimately involved in conscious thought and conscious cognition.

5. Core identity seems to be detached from subconscious thought and subconscious cognition.

6. Core identity is not altered by the experiential content of the stream of consciousness. My thoughts, memories, state of mind, and sensory inputs can vary widely and these things impact my core identity but do not alter its fundamental identity.

I'll add more to this debate later on but I want to drop a comment right now.

I think we'll get much closer to understanding how the brain percieves itself and the mind through scientific venues of research in the not-so-distant future. Do not necessarily assume that this discussion is relegated entirely to philosphical and subjective discourse.

i suggest that i was only a copy from my current perspective, and from my second birthday perspective i am currently a copy from a later time, so does the answer not depend on which perspective i choose to answer from. i gave no answer.

My present self.
I just can't imagine myself someone which is more alike to my very own self than me, not even a copy, doesn't matter if I were 2 years old, I am still the same self, much more close than a copy, the fact that I can't know what is my copy knows at that moment... I just can't imagine a copy of myself it just won't be myself!, I won't trust it, I don't believe it will be an exact me, just a copy. I can't imagine a copy of myself which is not me and I can think as it. I mean if I am not having that awarness... Hell that is so sophisticated, I don't know how to explain!
It's like I trust only the current of what I know as myself, there is no more "me" 'cause I won't be able to call something which I don't being it as "me"...
Moreover, I didn't have many changes in my because of the years in my view, only experience, bases to the views, knowledge etcetera... I remember myself wondering about everything, since I knew how to wonder, since I had something to wonder about- - I just did.
I have so much memories, but personal, memories of my thoughts, years ago. Some of them, people just won't believe me. I rememeber flashes from the era I was only few days years old. but only flashes. I don't expect anyone to believe me, but it is nice to know or at least to think I know that I was wondering like, what the hell is everything, It was beautiful to wonder without knowing you do, without knowing on what, without knowing jow, without knowing, just wondering...
Never mind, I doubt if you understood what I meant.

~Infernity

I think I changed my mind... sophistication... yes I did... not sure it is ultimate...

~Infernity