37 replies to this topic

[Kalepha]

This thread is for discussions or debates of elements in personal identity theories, yours or whoevers. I'm thinking this might be a little different from a couple of the presently pinned topics, since I hope that deeper inferences of what personal identity is can be discussed in addition to what personal identity is.

Considering six basic components to a problem -- three in the acquaintance of the model, which could be the representations of (1) the problem domain, (2) the evaluative function, and (3) the optimal solution codomain, and three in the least formal acquaintance, which could be (4) the situation, (5) the manipulator function, and (6) the end state range -- I find it acceptable to develop (3) with the minimum possible known-physics bias, with (1) being more grounded and (2) being, perhaps by far, the most grounded, though to the extent it doesn't go beyond its permitted budget for the model.

For my personal identity theory, the optimal solution is dynamic, developed along with the intersection of conceivability and possibility limits. One apparent limit in this intersection (always restricted by my ability to form and prove general qualities, let alone to express them) may be observed with the statement that given an appropriate definition of omniscience, omniscience is impossible if it's possible for a distinct but not necessarily disjoint cognitive particle P1 in n-dimensional space to have the higher predictive capability while being logically unable to communicate all its knowledge of cognitive particle P2 to P2, a resident of an m-dimensional space, where m < n. This is supposed to mean that any cognitive particle never can know whether or not it knows everything when it's numerically identical, in the limit, with its observable universe.

One moral that can accompany this observation is simply to deny that it's sensical and then go on feeling like and claiming to be God when the horizon of your selected empirical universe is most likely the epistemic horizon of your cognitive particle. Another moral that can attach to it, which happens to be mine, is to accept it and then go on to possess a good definition of arrogance, when you're godlike and probably fooled in being godlike, and attempt to avoid being arrogant. Intrinsic pharmaceutical technology (or perhaps surjective injections from P1) should be a good partial solution for analogue pleasures to master morality for an otherwise equal state. Where my personal identity theory might seem to reflect an epistemological skepticism, however, I would suggest rather that it's currently a decent response to epistemological skepticism and an input that an optimal solution is likely going to need.

Among yet other optimal-solution informants with regard to personal identity theory, I want to be further along in clarifying the issue of redundant "qualitatively identical" persons. At first glance, it would seem wise for a cognitive particle to be a set of entangled qualitatively identical persons. In the designs of some (though not all) functionalists, the potential permanent death of one person instance is morally permissible simply because its status as a moral subject is numerically identical with one or more person instances in the set: in replacing it with a construction of another person instance, no loss is incurred beyond having to tolerate a slight inconvenience in manufacturing, and no moral failure is incurred regardless.

For other functionalists, those disposed to a greater radical particularism, that a cognitive particle's persons are qualitatively identical wouldn't be enough, not even if their executive experience component denied them knowledge of their relative positions to each other in x-space. Subdoxastic objects, even with respect to the necessary internalistic epistemology, ensure that each person instance is a moral subject of its own moral agency. Contrary to wishes, this is unfortunate, because it seems that an executive operator in chosen denial (or pure ignorance) can't increase its unitary durability by increasing the number of its independent clones and certainly not by increasing the number of autonomous lovers of life with the freedom and ability to configure "surprising" end states, also very if not more unfortunately.

If you have thoughts on this, or if you have other thoughts just with respect to the topic, please share them.

[RighteousReason]

whoa

[Kalepha]

For a painfully long time, it felt like complex life implied an eternity of petty political conflicts, rooting from the boundary between algorithm normalization and brutal uncertainty, and from the race to dominate each territory and, on ownmost terms, fortify the boundary.

All stable processes we shall predict. All unstable processes we shall control (John von Neumann).

Yet even the most elementary and naive coup d'oeil over abstract mathematics and cognitive philosophy, without the constrained science-fiction frames, bears if not immediate knowledge, smart intuitive hope, a potential seed of Intelligence and Numbing Beauty.

[gashinshotan]

Why are you applying physics to biology?

[gashinshotan]

This thread is for discussions or debates of elements in personal identity theories, yours or whoevers. I'm thinking this might be a little different from a couple of the presently pinned topics, since I hope that deeper inferences of what personal identity is can be discussed in addition to what personal identity is.

Considering six basic components to a problem -- three in the acquaintance of the model, which could be the representations of (1) the problem domain, (2) the evaluative function, and (3) the optimal solution codomain, and three in the least formal acquaintance, which could be (4) the situation, (5) the manipulator function, and (6) the end state range -- I find it acceptable to develop (3) with the minimum possible known-physics bias, with (1) being more grounded and (2) being, perhaps by far, the most grounded, though to the extent it doesn't go beyond its permitted budget for the model.

For my personal identity theory, the optimal solution is dynamic, developed along with the intersection of conceivability and possibility limits. One apparent limit in this intersection (always restricted by my ability to form and prove general qualities, let alone to express them) may be observed with the statement that given an appropriate definition of omniscience, omniscience is impossible if it's possible for a distinct but not necessarily disjoint cognitive particle P1 in n-dimensional space to have the higher predictive capability while being logically unable to communicate all its knowledge of cognitive particle P2 to P2, a resident of an m-dimensional space, where m < n. This is supposed to mean that any cognitive particle never can know whether or not it knows everything when it's numerically identical, in the limit, with its observable universe.

One moral that can accompany this observation is simply to deny that it's sensical and then go on feeling like and claiming to be God when the horizon of your selected empirical universe is most likely the epistemic horizon of your cognitive particle. Another moral that can attach to it, which happens to be mine, is to accept it and then go on to possess a good definition of arrogance, when you're godlike and probably fooled in being godlike, and attempt to avoid being arrogant. Intrinsic pharmaceutical technology (or perhaps surjective injections from P1) should be a good partial solution for analogue pleasures to master morality for an otherwise equal state. Where my personal identity theory might seem to reflect an epistemological skepticism, however, I would suggest rather that it's currently a decent response to epistemological skepticism and an input that an optimal solution is likely going to need.

Among yet other optimal-solution informants with regard to personal identity theory, I want to be further along in clarifying the issue of redundant "qualitatively identical" persons. At first glance, it would seem wise for a cognitive particle to be a set of entangled qualitatively identical persons. In the designs of some (though not all) functionalists, the potential permanent death of one person instance is morally permissible simply because its status as a moral subject is numerically identical with one or more person instances in the set: in replacing it with a construction of another person instance, no loss is incurred beyond having to tolerate a slight inconvenience in manufacturing, and no moral failure is incurred regardless.

For other functionalists, those disposed to a greater radical particularism, that a cognitive particle's persons are qualitatively identical wouldn't be enough, not even if their executive experience component denied them knowledge of their relative positions to each other in x-space. Subdoxastic objects, even with respect to the necessary internalistic epistemology, ensure that each person instance is a moral subject of its own moral agency. Contrary to wishes, this is unfortunate, because it seems that an executive operator in chosen denial (or pure ignorance) can't increase its unitary durability by increasing the number of its independent clones and certainly not by increasing the number of autonomous lovers of life with the freedom and ability to configure "surprising" end states, also very if not more unfortunately.

If you have thoughts on this, or if you have other thoughts just with respect to the topic, please share them.

Your post is rife with baseless opinions which you try to legitimize through overly complex language which in itself only reveals ridiculousness of your post! You ignore human consciousness as a factor completely and assume everyone behaves the same.

[Kalepha]

Why are you applying physics to biology?

It seems that way. I'm applying several basic concepts, through physics, complex systems, cognitive psychology, and ethics. But the concept of the abstract object should help with its comprehensibility.

Not that you wouldn't have the knowledge to comprehend it; I could be trying to encode too much semantic content into single statements (some of which would then give other statements more meaning) and expecting very charitable inferences all over. This is a common symptom of not having the mathematics caught up to intuition to make it more plausible. Serious theologians and postmodernists tend to have this problem. But I'm neither, so I don't feel very unreasonable in expecting some of this empathy.

An abstract object is a modeling tool for perceiving relations with the object, in addition to perceiving relations with the object's details. Sometimes the lower levels of details aren't important, only the abstract object, so that's why it's used. A particle is an abstract object, with potentially lower levels of details. I could've used system in its place, and it wouldn't have mattered that much, except they could have subtly different connotations. I preferred the partial connotation of the particle, a trade-off I had to make with its association to physics.

I would accept more blame for garbled thought with phrases like observable universe, because I apply what's probably an unconventional notion of observation. Exceedingly high expectations. Observe with this statement X. Thus, one can make an observation with or without the transducers of an arbitrarily demarcated sensorium. Your observable (or empirical) universe could be an aleph-alpha-world cosmology, and if you were numerically identical with this cosmology, your experience space would be vast and sufficiently acquainted with its content.

Your post is rife with baseless opinions which you try to legitimize through overly complex language which in itself only reveals ridiculousness of your post! You ignore human consciousness as a factor completely and assume everyone behaves the same.

Short of granting God status to absolutely nothing (not even God could honestly claim to be God), I grant a diversity of behaviors, lest I increase my "magnitude" of being a lost cause.

[DJS]

For other functionalists, those disposed to a greater radical particularism, that a cognitive particle's persons are qualitatively identical wouldn't be enough, not even if their executive experience component denied them knowledge of their relative positions to each other in x-space. Subdoxastic objects, even with respect to the necessary internalistic epistemology, ensure that each person instance is a moral subject of its own moral agency. Contrary to wishes, this is unfortunate, because it seems that an executive operator in chosen denial (or pure ignorance) can't increase its unitary durability by increasing the number of its independent clones and certainly not by increasing the number of autonomous lovers of life with the freedom and ability to configure "surprising" end states, also very if not more unfortunately.

For the life of me, I can't understand why the presence of subdoxastic objects secures/locks in the uniqueness of a particular psychology and its "identity". You make this claim without any elaboration. So for now I find myself content, and justified, in sticking with the mainstream functionalist line on identity.

Yippie. An honest appraisal (or perhaps just raw intuition) on my part which brings with it a judgement of most fortunate. Wonders never cease.

[Kalepha]

For the life of me, I can't understand why the presence of subdoxastic objects secures/locks in the uniqueness of a particular psychology and its "identity". You make this claim without any elaboration. So for now I find myself content, and justified, in sticking with the mainstream functionalist line on identity.

The typical definition of subdoxastic object is a presymbolic awareness, for those who're wondering.

I believe there are various levels of awareness, similar to most functionalists, but furthermore that any level of awareness is in some way symbolic, so that there needs not to be such a thing as presymbolic awareness, which marks the deviation. What there could be is predecoded information, and this preserves the notion of subdoxastic objects while extending its applicability. For instance, there is predecoded information about Earth's history in geological structures, and when and if it's decoded in a mind, those symbols in the mind didn't exist before, while the predecoded information, we usually concede, did, regardless.

For persons, consider two artificial ones in separate artificial environments across the land. Suppose they -- the subjects and the environments -- are constructed equivalently in every way, except for being one and the same (i.e., a numerical identity). On their terms, the predecoded information is their relations with each other: that there is another, somewhere else. They are qualitatively identical (or, better, qualitatively similar, as the other term can mislead), but since, as moral agents, some of us wouldn't go in and kill either, we can infer that each is uniquely a moral subject of its own unique moral agency.

[DJS]

For persons, consider two artificial ones in separate artificial environments across the land. Suppose they -- the subjects and the environments -- are constructed equivalently in every way, except for being one and the same (i.e., a numerical identity). On their terms, the predecoded information is their relations with each other: that there is another, somewhere else. They are qualitatively identical (or, better, qualitatively similar, as the other term can mislead), but since, as moral agents, some of us wouldn't go in and kill either, we can infer that each is uniquely a moral subject of its own unique moral agency.

How is one to know what is wishful thinking - and what is not - when desire can be such a corruptive force? Sometimes your “greater radical particularism” strikes me as indicative of a functionalist who can’t bring himself to shedding residual libertarian yearnings. From my perspective there is no support for such a stance on either logical or empirical grounds.

Does, out of necessity, a moral subject qualify as a “unique moral subject”? I think not.

[DJS]

Furthermore, would reluctance on our parts to kill an entity be the product of its uniqueness or its moral agency?

[RighteousReason]

Furthermore, would reluctance on our parts to kill an entity be the product of its uniqueness or its moral agency?

what do you mean by moral agency?

Edited by CSstudent, 22 November 2007 - 02:30 AM.

[Kalepha]

How is one to know what is wishful thinking - and what is not - when desire can be such a corruptive force?

Desire and wishful thought could be synonymous, and desire can be modeled in a problem. Perhaps the best I can do is both (i) perform the more formal activity of representing the least formal activity of satisfying the problem and (ii) performing the satisfying of the problem. Is there ever 100% certainty until completion? Likely with you, I believe no.

By more or less formal activity I allude to various types, or degrees, of experience, which I believe is variably abstract over all.

Does, out of necessity, a moral subject qualify as a “unique moral subject”? I think not.

what do you mean by moral agency?

Basically, a moral subject is identified by a moral agent, and a moral agent identifies a moral subject. A moral subject is an entity that can either do well or not do well, and this is identified and defined by a moral agent. A moral agent, then, takes responsibility in considering a moral subject (or moral subjects) through decision making.

Furthermore, would reluctance on our parts to kill an entity be the product of its uniqueness or its moral agency?

It would be the product of being a moral agent on our parts and the identification of a moral subject.

[RighteousReason]

A moral agent, then, takes responsibility in considering a moral subject (or moral subjects) through decision making.

well... two identical moral subjects would be two separate physical entities, and thus subject to unique consideration in the decision process of a moral agent... right?

[RighteousReason]

"It would be the product of being a moral agent on our parts and the identification of a moral subject. "

yeah

[Kalepha]

well... two identical moral subjects would be two separate physical entities, and thus subject to unique consideration in the decision process of a moral agent... right?

Right, Hank. Also, just strictly according to definitions, two moral subjects, whether qualitatively very similar or qualitatively very different, would be under unique consideration in the decision process of a moral agent.

Something else. To be explicit, the definition of a moral agent is intended to be general and doesn't specify how identification and the defining of well-doing is supposed to come about. It is simply enkindled for its distinction and relationship to the moral subject (abstract object mode). Similarly with the definition of a moral subject. And obviously -- deductively -- any particular moral subject could be identified by multiple moral agents who define its well-doing differently and consider it differently through each of their decision processes.

[william7]

whoa

I say double whoa!

"Simplify, simplify"
- Henry David Thoreau

[Kalepha]

whoa

I say double whoa!

"Simplify, simplify"
- Henry David Thoreau

I don't pretend that the prose is perfect or that I've stopped wanting to be better.

[. . .] I could be trying to encode too much semantic content into single statements (some of which would then give other statements more meaning) and expecting very charitable inferences all over. This is a common symptom of not having the mathematics caught up to intuition to make it more plausible. Serious theologians and postmodernists tend to have this problem. But I'm neither, so I don't feel very unreasonable in expecting some of this empathy.

[. . .] the optimal solution is dynamic, developed along with the intersection of conceivability [implied to improve] and possibility limits.

Still, most of the stuff is elementary, with only one or two pretensions of originality, or at least of that which I wish I've seen more people in the neighborhood discuss, being reasonable enough not to expect them to go too far astray from their current methods of rationality.

Edited by Kalepha, 26 December 2007 - 09:29 PM.

[Kalepha]

[. . .] only one or two pretensions of originality [. . .]

Manea, Mihai (2006). "Serial dictatorship and pareto optimality." <http://www.people.fa...u/~mmanea/. . .>

ABSTRACT. In a deterministic allocation problem in which each agent is entitled to receive exactly one object, an allocation is Pareto optimal if and only if it is the outcome of a serial dictatorship. We extend the definition of serial dictatorship to settings in which some agents may be entitled to receive more than one object, and study the efficiency and uniqueness properties of the equilibrium allocations. We prove that subgame perfect equilibrium allocations of serial dictatorship games are not necessarily Pareto optimal; and generally not all Pareto optima can be implemented as subgame perfect equilibrium allocations of serial dictatorship games, except in the 2-agent separable preference case. Moreover, serial dictatorship games do not necessarily have unique subgame perfect equilibrium allocations, except in the 2-agent case, hence their outcomes are indeterminate and manipulable.

[Kalepha]

While an internalistic epistemology continues its calling (a view that justification, or degrees of justification, for "knowledge" exists in mental symbols, not external to them, one reason being for an answer to epistemological skepticism, another reason being that knowledge is only good for symbol systems anyway, the compelled final deciders of what could depend/codepend/not depend on what and how/how much, at least until natural selection, which they cannot altogether be even if they wanted to, somehow proves them misguided or obsolete; a subjective Bayesianism could be one), here's in trying to use the general concept of identity as some counsel for a philosophy of mathematics. I think I'd want it to float somewhere between platonism and nominalism, e.g., all mathematical intensions are expected only contingently to have extensions besides themselves, with the only constraints of rigor, beauty, and keeping inquisitional (problem-formulating) heuristic processes from being completely displaced by algorithmic processes (at least in a relative sense, if intensions should also assume, and sometimes take for granted carefully, some infrastructure to their vehicular volition):

Object. An object O has one property of identity: (i) O is numerically identical to O.
Experience. An experience E simultaneously has two properties of identity: (i) E is numerically identical to E, and (ii) E qualitatively corresponds to an object O. (It's possible that E = O.)
Mathematical experience. A mathematical experience M simultaneously has three properties of identity: (i) M is numerically identical to M, (ii) M qualitatively corresponds to an object O, and (iii) M partially defines a unique ectropy maximization.

Here's another view of why a philosophy of mathematics would be concerned with floating somewhere between platonism and nominalism. The contingency relation is used, also, toward a conclusion. Curiously, but for good balance if I'm a hopeless fool, it seems to be from externalist epistemological sympathies and without regard for the difference between (somewhat but not completely overlapping) heuristic and algorithmic observer modes:

Colyvan, Mark (2006). "Scientific realism and mathematical nominalism: A marriage made in hell." <http://homepage.mac....rs/Musgrave.pdf>

ABSTRACT. The Quine-Putnam Indispensability argument is the argument for treating mathematical entities on a par with other theoretical entities of our best scientific theories. This argument is usually taken to be an argument for mathematical realism. In this chapter I will argue that the proper way to understand this argument is as putting pressure on the viability of the marriage of scientific realism and mathematical nominalism. Although such a marriage is a popular option amongst philosophers of science and mathematics, in light of the indispensability argument, the marriage is seen to be very unstable. Unless one is careful about how the Quine-Putnam argument is disarmed, one can be forced to either mathematical realism or, alternatively, scientific instrumentalism. [. . .]

Edited by Kalepha, 30 December 2007 - 08:53 PM.

[chubtoad]

While an internalistic epistemology continues its calling (a view that justification, or degrees of justification, for "knowledge" exists in mental symbols, not external to them, one reason being for an answer to epistemological skepticism, another reason being that knowledge is only good for symbol systems anyway, the compelled final deciders of what could depend/codepend/not depend on what and how/how much, at least until natural selection, which they cannot altogether be even if they wanted to, somehow proves them misguided or obsolete; a subjective Bayesianism could be one), here's in trying to use the general concept of identity as some counsel for a philosophy of mathematics. I think I'd want it to float somewhere between platonism and nominalism, e.g., all mathematical intensions are expected only contingently to have extensions besides themselves, with the only constraints of rigor, beauty, and keeping inquisitional (problem-formulating) heuristic processes from being completely displaced by algorithmic processes (at least in a relative sense, if intensions should also assume, and sometimes take for granted carefully, some infrastructure to their vehicular volition):

Object. An object O has one property of identity: (i) O is numerically identical to O.
Experience. An experience E simultaneously has two properties of identity: (i) E is numerically identical to E, and (ii) E qualitatively corresponds to an object O. (It's possible that E = O.)
Mathematical experience. A mathematical experience M simultaneously has three properties of identity: (i) M is numerically identical to M, (ii) M qualitatively corresponds to an object O, and (iii) M partially defines a unique ectropy maximization.

Here's another view of why a philosophy of mathematics would be concerned with floating somewhere between platonism and nominalism. The contingency relation is used, also, toward a conclusion. Curiously, but for good balance if I'm a hopeless fool, it seems to be from externalist epistemological sympathies and without regard for the difference between (somewhat but not completely overlapping) heuristic and algorithmic observer modes:

Colyvan, Mark (2006). "Scientific realism and mathematical nominalism: A marriage made in hell." <http://homepage.mac....rs/Musgrave.pdf>

ABSTRACT. The Quine-Putnam Indispensability argument is the argument for treating mathematical entities on a par with other theoretical entities of our best scientific theories. This argument is usually taken to be an argument for mathematical realism. In this chapter I will argue that the proper way to understand this argument is as putting pressure on the viability of the marriage of scientific realism and mathematical nominalism. Although such a marriage is a popular option amongst philosophers of science and mathematics, in light of the indispensability argument, the marriage is seen to be very unstable. Unless one is careful about how the Quine-Putnam argument is disarmed, one can be forced to either mathematical realism or, alternatively, scientific instrumentalism. [. . .]

What is the point of this spew of jargon? If you have thoughts about the question of personal identity put them in plain english.

[DJS]

Often "plain english" lacks the requisite precision to resolve the apparent problems created by higher levels of philosophical abstraction.

I find it amusing that so many ImmInst posters get bent out of shape by philosophical "jargon", but have no qualms wading through piles of dense technical literature in molecular biology. Imagine someone demanding that a theoretical biologist explain the mechanisms of oncogenesis - but in plain english!

Edited by Technosophy, 03 January 2008 - 03:42 PM.

[RighteousReason]

subjective Bayesianism

I vote for that one!

cool paper...

[RighteousReason]

There is something that just seems nonsensical about this. "Mathematical entities" isn't ever defined well enough to make sense.

he says:
The
problem is simply that if mathematical entities exist, as the mathematical
realist would have it, then we require an adequate account of how we come
by knowledge of such entities. After all, mathematical entities, if they exist,
do not seem to be the kinds of things that have space-time locations or have
causal powers.

but he also says:
the appeal to playing an
indispensable role (without further qualification) in a best scientific theory
would also seem to license the acceptance of mathematical entities.

Our brain interprets mathematical entities as both symbolic variables and as causal pointers to functions. Just because the functions are real doesn't mean the symbols somehow are.

[RighteousReason]

haha random comment...

[Freelancer]

I get that some basic language isn't sufficient to describe some subjects.

For the people who don't want to wade through tiring abstract language can you please give a basic outline in basic english of what you mean?


There ain't no fucking point in discussing anything if the communication is shot because half your audience doesn't have a clue what your talking about...

[Kalepha]

Personal identity is a broad topic, and it's broader if you're a god. As suggested, you're welcome to reset the tone with ideas of your own.

Edited by Kalepha, 06 January 2008 - 07:37 PM.

[justinb]

Personal identity is a broad topic, and it's broader if you're a god. As suggested, you're welcome to reset the tone with ideas of your own.

Kalepha,

LOL!!!! to e-mail "problem"

[Kalepha]

In a scenario where the pure strategy of every person has been to leave no non-person objects left in existence, nothing is left in existence except persons. Where nothing is left in existence except persons, the only things distinct from a given person are other persons and its relations to other persons. For this scenario, one argument can be put:

1. Possibly, someone else knows that disastrous event E will happen to me.

2. Necessarily, if someone else knows that disastrous event E will happen to me, then there's nothing I can do to avoid disastrous event E.

C. Possibly, it isn't true that there's nothing I can do to avoid disastrous event E happening to me if and only if no one knows that disastrous event E will happen to me.

This argument's validity should be easy enough to check, and I don't find its premises obviously incorrect. Let me have it otherwise. For now, this may serve as some clarification toward to an issue raised earlier here and also as a direct response to a secular reading of Swartz's "Foreknowledge and Free Will" entry [1].

[1] Swartz, Norman (2004). "Foreknowledge and Free Will." IEP. < http://www.iep.utm.edu/f/foreknow.htm >.

Edited by Kalepha, 30 January 2008 - 09:41 AM.

[Kalepha]

When I reflect philosophically, sometimes I don't bother with trying to determine the consistency of the reflections, and if I start to bother at all, I just sketch, usually in outline form, intuitively related thoughts to check if anything immediately strikes me as inconsistent. For the argument in the previous post, I actually wanted to verify the logic (and did), but sometimes, in the step after first chore, I don't bother with trying to attain comprehensive systematicity with greater formal analysis either and put it off with the intention of getting to it later. "Notes" indicate a starting point to bothering.

It shouldn't be very troublesome that some standard terms go undefined and yet sometimes are used with slightly different meanings from those with which others have used them. But this is common even among the professionals; and irrespectively, a) sometimes that's the point (refinement through meaning drift) and b) pedantry, I believe, can't seal every last crack of premeditated rejection.

Notes i: Nature of truths (concerns knowledge)

1. Objects do not bear truth values, except the objects of truth-value assignments. (Truth values may be other than true and false (e.g., correct and incorrect), and may also consist in an infinite set [0, 1].)

2. Objects may or may not be assigned a truth value.

3. To assign a truth value to an object is to have a feeling that a proper relation holds or proper relations hold for the object's identity.

3.1. If a statement (i.e., a "statement token") is true, then this means that a mind intuits that the statement sufficiently corresponds to its mental proposition and that the mental proposition is consistent with other mental propositions.

3.2. Generally, if an object is true, then this means that a mind intuits that the object accurately is an extension of its mental intension and that the mental intension is consistent with other mental intensions.

4. Suppose the mind perceives the beach. Apparently at once, the object 'the beach' is assumed 'to be', and this assumption is a truth-value assignment. Perhaps a deflationist can't understand that there's an occurrence of a truth-value assignment and that it's distinct from the object because perceptions (or acquaintances, including the subset of descriptions) seem to be unitary events; after a point, it might no longer be helpful to reduce perceptions further, but there are some perceptions whose inaccuracy we thankfully had wanted to put forth more effort in realizing, and likewise there are some perceptions about whose accuracy we would want to put forth more effort in withholding judgment.

5. Mental intensions are occurrences in cognitive systems and are themselves objects, in reality and of its aspects.

6. It is not helpful to believe that "truths" exist independently of truth-value assignments, since truths just are mind-generated qualities. Rather, there are 'truth conditions' that exist independently of truth-value assignments, conditions that may or may not make truth-value assignments actual or accurate.

6.1. My impression is that this, what I strongly believe illuminates a misunderstanding is prevalent (though not assumed everywhere) and the misapplications are far-reaching, where the unnecessary and confused negative effects of the equivocations are so distant as to make it very difficult to realize the problematic source and even that there's one in the first place. Where it's taken as given that knowledge is "true belief," much wasted effort is likely to follow, since more than merely beliefs can be true, and more significantly since truths are mental constructs that, critically, overlap with justification, while the conditions of truths (a subset being neural) underlie the truth values, some conditions (both neural and non-neural) which also can overlap with justification, such that different and hard-to-pin justification dispositions not only account for the prevalent fact of needless equivocation on "truth" but also for the more unfortunate circumstance that the already deeply concealed equivocations vary widely.

Edited by Kalepha, 31 January 2008 - 03:18 AM.

[Kalepha]

Notes ii: Developing consciousness

1. Asking how "neural conditions [X]" give rise to consciousness is like asking how some particular set of conscious representations (of the neural conditions X) can give rise to consciousness. However, it doesn't seem like a set of conscious representations can give rise to consciousness, because, first of all, consciousness giving rise to consciousness either doesn't make sense or is pointless. Better inquiries could involve perceiving and comprehending many more conditions or data and then coherent application so that consciousness becomes qualitatively better and so realized with the aids of increasingly demanding, well-constructed tests.

2. One way to make conscious events better over a period is by studying and reflecting, and this way should never be abandoned or accidentally forgotten. Another way to make conscious events better over a period is by manipulating their deeper underlying conditions.

2.1. This second point might seem like a needless oversimplification of the first point, but its lesson to me is slightly different, as it seems that it would be important to be aware of how one balances, to put it more metaphorically, going about engineering faster thought speeds and going about developing the sense of how to think and what to think about in the first place (especially during those periods when "engineering faster thought speeds" is very reasonably an attention-wasting pipe dream).