What Constitutes "me"?

I think we are escaped from the start topic. What is the essence of "Me" or what constitutes the human being and what part of us have to be saved to achieve personal immortality. So I think it's crucial to define what is essential and what is secondary. In this line of speculation I detect conversations of type copy or not copy, reincarnation, God and soul and so on.... as a NOISE of Communication.
I think we have to establish some scientific terms (for me the phylosophy is part of the science) and then to speculate with them.
So, the comprehesion of space with more than 3 dimentional measuring system is very helpfull for the development of thinking, but it have to be noticed that the most human "reality", language and thoughts are 3 dimentional and this way the conversation of more than 3 dimentions in english is practically impossible without using mathematical models

But why we have to discover something new and ...
Why don't we look at the results we also have.
For example, the nature is already achieved immortality of genes. But not of DNA.
In this way of speculations we probably are not capable to achieve immortality of brain (or body) but immortality of mind (consciousness + memory ... ... ) without using terms like reincarnation, God or other mystical terminology but in terms of cybernetics.

Can I find people who think like me here?

I've often thought that - what is the consciousness by itself? ie: If you don't have eyes then what do you see?

if we had the technology to completly copy the brain of somebody down to every detail. then which one would be the person it is impossible for them both to be. if it was the orginal brain then how can we ever hope to upload someone because surely it would just be someone who acts the same as the person but not the same person. The death of the orginal brain even at the same time as uploading someone would surely just be somoeone else.

Consciousness according to Kurzweil

A Thought Experiment

Let's consider the issue of just who I am, and who the new Ray is a little more carefully. First of all, am I the stuff in my brain and body?

Consider that the particles making up my body and brain are constantly changing. We are not at all permanent collections of particles. The cells in our bodies turn over at different rates, but the particles (e.g., atoms and molecules) that comprise our cells are exchanged at a very rapid rate. I am just not the same collection of particles that I was even a month ago. It is the patterns of matter and energy that are semipermanent (that is, changing only gradually), but our actual material content is changing constantly, and very quickly. We are rather like the patterns that water makes in a stream. The rushing water around a formation of rocks makes a particular, unique pattern. This pattern may remain relatively unchanged for hours, even years. Of course, the actual material constituting the pattern--the water--is replaced in milliseconds. The same is true for Ray Kurzweil. Like the water in a stream, my particles are constantly changing, but the pattern that people recognize as Ray has a reasonable level of continuity. This argues that we should not associate our fundamental identity with a specific set of particles, but rather the pattern of matter and energy that we represent. Many contemporary philosophers seem partial to this "identify from pattern" argument.

But (again) wait.

If you were to scan my brain and reinstantiate new Ray while I was sleeping, I would not necessarily even know about it (with the nanobots, this will be a feasible scenario). If you then come to me, and say, "good news, Ray, we've successfully reinstantiated your mind file, so we won't be needing your old brain anymore," I may suddenly realize the flaw in this "identity from pattern" argument. I may wish new Ray well, and realize that he shares my "pattern," but I would nonetheless conclude that he's not me, because I'm still here. How could he be me? After all, I would not necessarily know that he even existed.

Let's consider another perplexing scenario. Suppose I replace a small number of biological neurons with functionally equivalent nonbiological ones (they may provide certain benefits such as greater reliability and longevity, but that's not relevant to this thought experiment). After I have this procedure performed, am I still the same person? My friends certainly think so. I still have the same self-deprecating humor, the same silly grin--yes, I'm still the same guy.

It should be clear where I'm going with this. Bit by bit, region by region, I ultimately replace my entire brain with essentially identical (perhaps improved) nonbiological equivalents (preserving all of the neurotransmitter concentrations and other details that represent my learning, skills, and memories). At each point, I feel the procedures were successful. At each point, I feel that I am the same guy. After each procedure, I claim to be the same guy. My friends concur. There is no old Ray and new Ray, just one Ray, one that never appears to fundamentally change.

But consider this. This gradual replacement of my brain with a nonbiological equivalent is essentially identical to the following sequence:

(i) scan Ray and reinstantiate Ray's mind file into new (nonbiological) Ray, and, then
(ii) terminate old Ray. But we concluded above that in such a scenario new Ray is not the same as old Ray. And if old Ray is terminated, well then that's the end of Ray. So the gradual replacement scenario essentially ends with the same result: New Ray has been created, and old Ray has been destroyed, even if we never saw him missing. So what appears to be the continuing existence of just one Ray is really the creation of new Ray and the termination of old Ray.
On yet another hand (we're running out of philosophical hands here), the gradual replacement scenario is not altogether different from what happens normally to our biological selves, in that our particles are always rapidly being replaced. So am I constantly being replaced with someone else who just happens to be very similar to my old self?

I am trying to illustrate why consciousness is not an easy issue. If we talk about consciousness as just a certain type of intelligent skill: the ability to reflect on one's own self and situation, for example, then the issue is not difficult at all because any skill or capability or form of intelligence that one cares to define will be replicated in nonbiological entities (i.e., machines) within a few decades. With this type of objective view of consciousness, the conundrums do go away. But a fully objective view does not penetrate to the core of the issue, because the essence of consciousness is subjective experience, not objective correlates of that experience.

Will these future machines be capable of having spiritual experiences?

They certainly will claim to. They will claim to be people, and to have the full range of emotional and spiritual experiences that people claim to have. And these will not be idle claims; they will evidence the sort of rich, complex, and subtle behavior one associates with these feelings. How do the claims and behaviors--compelling as they will be--relate to the subjective experience of these reinstantiated people? We keep coming back to the very real but ultimately unmeasurable issue of consciousness.

People often talk about consciousness as if it were a clear property of an entity that can readily be identified, detected, and gauged. If there is one crucial insight that we can make regarding why the issue of consciousness is so contentious, it is the following:

There exists no objective test that can conclusively determine its presence.

There exists no objective test that can conclusively determine its presence.

Thus the question becomes "Is the way we are speaking of consciousness here even meaningful?" Our folk psychological ways of speaking about consciousness are quite a jumble. Daniel Dennett (http://www.trincoll....ls/dennett.html) in Consciousness Explained, Paul Churchland (http://www.trincoll....churchland.html) in Matter and Consciousness and Francis Crick (http://www.amazon.co...=glance&s=books) in The Astonishing Hypothesis seem to be on the right track in reformulating the kinds of questions and and statements about consciousness that can sensibly be made. The position that makes the most sense to me is that the self we talk about so confusedly, with its intentionality and apparent unity is an ex post facto story we tell ourselves and others--almost a habit of mind that comes about from the nature of language. I know that is confusing. If I said anything more, I'd probably butcher the concept beyond recognition (if I haven't already), but you can read those books for a better idea of what I mean. It would be a good investment in time; they are quite excellent.

Hugh

I think out of this raises an important question:

How will we be able to prove scientifically that a continuity of consciousness has occured in such a scenario?

Good question - you would never be able to "prove" it 100%. Nothing in the universe can be absolutely proven 100%. The best you can get is a probabilistic estimate based on your current evidence and models. You can't prove that aliens come to your bed every night, mutilate your brain, and replace it with a new one each morning, without leaving a trace. We should be able to obtain a degree of confidence with uploading that meets or surpasses our everyday confidence that our "continuity of identity" is preserved - we aren't so paranoid about our own identity that we own booby-trapped cameras recording the actions occurring in a room while we are asleep, right?

You can't prove that aliens come to your bed every night, mutilate your brain, and replace it with a new one each morning, without leaving a trace.  We should be able to obtain a degree of confidence with uploading that meets or surpasses our everyday confidence that our "continuity of identity" is preserved - we aren't so paranoid about our own identity that we own booby-trapped cameras recording the actions occurring in a room while we are asleep, right?

Michael, I have had similar thoughts about the continuity of consciousness. Sleep represents a discontinuity of consciousness, yet because of it's necessity, people have learned to deal with it. We are also conditioned by past experience to fully believe we will "rise again".
Did you ever notice little kids are afraid to go to sleep at night? They are not yet fully confident that they will rise again. Of course, the crazy christians know how to compensate for this..."and if I die before I wake, pray the Lord my soul to take." They think of everything, don't they. [lol]

For most people, uploading will take some getting use to. But after a while, one will probably have more confidence about uploading than waking up in the morning.

I think reservations about uploading come from people who still reserve some place in their heart for the supernatural. They still possess some level of disbelief that the individual is purely physical. If one embraces the physical world as the only plane of existence, then uploading is not quite as controversial.

Kissinger

Edited by Kissinger, 25 July 2003 - 07:56 AM.

yeah obvioulsy their is a massive amount of evidence to support the purely physical perspecitive and it does make a lot of sense. Except that the physical 'patterns' could be duplicated but they would still be two diffrent people that would act allmost exactly the same but still it is impossible for a person to be in 2 places at once. There must be something about a person that makes them fundamtally diffrent so that the orginal person is in there body. and the new but identical person is in theres.

and also the me that began this sentance is not the same me that is now ending it as my 'pattern ' has changed slightly which essentially means that billions of counsinesses have been destroyed to create the instanoeus 'me' of the now and I just think that I am the same me because of memeories.

so not only is the idea that we are puely physcical (even though I find a 'soul' even harder to believe)hard to beleive because what would make me here instead of in another identical brain. ( which there may well be true given the mutliverse theories) in other words I am unique and permeinant which is pretty impossible with just physical. or I am an istanoueos consiouness that exists only now and given the right conditions i could become you. and the idea of me is just an illusion based on memories which kinda makes immoratality pointless any way

What constitutes me?

Well, I do.

Experience constitutes me. We're talking about preservation of identity, right?
What constitutes identity? From my standpoint as a Mormon, the intelligence that
existed infinitely before spiritual and later physical inception perhaps had greater
or lesser magnitude in intensity than some other intelligence, of which there
are infinite many. Without constituent matter, identifying differences between
my fellow identityless intelligences would be rather on the impossible side.

Spiritual inception, or creation if you'd like to call it that, then gives me an identity.
I'm a son of heavenly Parents. (I understand that most of this is theologically
foreign to most of you, but bare with me, and feel free to ask questions if you care
to.) I had thought, choice, progression... as everybody did.

Coming to 'mortality,' or at least a physical creation (don't be misled, however,
all spirit is physical matter), I lost knowledge of that place. How do I have it now?
Well, that's for inquiring minds who really want to know. Without that knowledge,
my identity is given by how I compare myself to my environment, how I fit in the
system. What experiences have I gained, and lessons learned, that distinguish me
from you? Certainly my genes have played a large role in those experiences, but
are those genes part of my identity? No, hardly. They're simply an environmental
factor that, along with other components of 'nurture,' have participated in giving
shape to my experience. Largely, my identity still is that, but in the context of a
greater spiritual system, there's more. And while my identity is always changing
because experience is always increasing, I'm still me. Am I different than I was
five years ago? A year ago? Yesterday? Yes, yes, and yes. It's even fair to say
that I've become a different person. Would I be able to say, "you're not me," if I
met myself 12 years in the past? I have a hard time imagining it. That person is
still me, still has my hopes and fears and dreams I've always had, even if the
particulars have changed. Clone me and upload my brain into the clone. Is the
clone still me? Eesh, I don't know. Even though we share all our experiences to
that point, his experiences beyond that point cease to be mine. I'd have to say,
no, this person isn't me anymore. I guess idenitity for practical purposes then
becomes the sum of one's set of experiences.

Eh, that's by no means inclusive... I just need a break.

yeah but my question to that is obvious for you cannot attempt to explain what you are by saying that you are the sum of your expiriences because surely that has to be a 'you' to have these expiriences. so yes sum of expirences is part of you but what is the thing that began expireincing before expirience? if you could upload whatever it is that expiriences then surely you could not say "Is the
clone still me? Eesh, I don't know. Even though we share all our experiences to
that point, his experiences beyond that point cease to be mine. I'd have to say,
no, this person isn't me anymore" because it would be YOU that is expiriencing everything from the point of the upload and therefore by your logic if it has your expiriences then it is you!

It was late. I was tired. :(

However, your assumption is that there is some essence of self that is who a person really is, beyond their personal experience, that existed before personal experience. What things would fit that? The 'intelligence before creation' would fit the criteria. Could it be that there's some essence of self that fundamentally seperates me from you, regardless of experience?

All that's required to have an experience is some point of observation. A computer can be programmed to actually experience things, but I doubt that it would know what to make of it. I doubt we know what to make of it at first either. (I don't know how much a newborn baby makes of anything.) So, the 'you' that has the experiences very well may just be your wetware in your noggin, although my personal feeling is that it's something more.

A point of observation, a brain, is not necessarily the essence of self. Maybe it's scafolding, outside structure and framework around which the self of experience is built. When there is no experience, there is no self, only a structure about which to build self. And when self is built, does it require the scaffolding anymore? Or can it stand on its own?

Allow me to clarify the last paragraph: I was referring to the brain as the scaffolding, if that's not apparent.

yeah I was getting at that there must be an essence of self other than personal expirience.for 2 reasons : 1 surely you are the same person you were beffore this conversation and 2 : if you say that the clone is not you because it has difffrent expriences to you this can't be true because at the instanoues moment the clone was created it had the same expriences as you if thats all you are then after that point then 'you' are both the orginal and the clone which should be impossible

Yeah, my initial thoughts about the 'clone' weren't quite right. But, perhaps the clone at the instant it gets my experiences IS me, but becomes less and less so, and there's a gradation in the differences between us where we become scalably different than each other as a function of events and experiences.

You know, this is as bad as contemplating temporal paradoxes.

yes I understood your argurment but my argurment is that if you and your clone are exactly the same at one point in time then any different expiriences you expirience after that would make them difefrent yes. But which one of the two would be you- since you would in a sense be having the expiriences of both of them since the two physcial objects were both you. any expiriences after that by either would technically be expirienced by you. In other words if both of them were exactly the same then why would one of them beceme more like you since any expirience can be had by anyone.( it does not become less you just different from the other you)

and yes it is pretty damn bad to contemplate

When I was kid, in the 1960s, it was taken for granted, by me and fellow futurists, that teleportaion would be available, soon, at least by 2001, or a tiny bit later.
Didn't happen. We are not even close to having a working theory on how to teleport, anything. That experiment in Australia, was interesting, but just a very small step. And, it might not bear any fruit.
I hope that teleportation doesn't become another scientific myth.

Also, there is no proof that we will ever be able to upload our minds, and bodies, into machine/computers, and have the copies be self-aware, and self-conscious. The copies will be just numbers crunching in a computer. How can they be alive?

For sake of arguement, there could never be a perfect copy of you, and me, because the copy would enter existence a distance away from the copied person, so right off the bat, you have a difference; in location, in worldlines.
A close copy, but never, ever perfect. But even if that coud be avoided:

we get all worked up about our personal egos; which translates as Me.
I find that those who get upset about this second Me, are usually atheists.

I find no problem with it, because behind all Me's, is the Eternal One Awareness, that masquerades as you, and, me.

The answers to all things are not in science; you have to go above and beyond science, to find answers to the most personal of all questions.

The religious answer is like this:

We are all connected to the Eternal One Awareness as Me's, and we are the Eternal One Awareness at the same time.
Another words, there is a background consciousness, behind all Me's, your Me, and my Me, so identity is no big problem, at the very basic, fundememtal level. There is only one Identity.
This is not pop mysticism. It is as old as the hills, and requires study of the best mystics, and contemplaters, in human history. You have to close your science books, read the mystics, and do some serious meditation/compemplation practices, for many years.

I admire the techie talk here, but you have to broaden your scope. Your worrying over nothing, and making a mountain out of a mole hill.

Whether there are a 100 copies of you, doesn't alter the fact, that all of you are still the One Awareness, the one Identity,
Every time a baby is born, the One Awareness, is putting on a new human garment.
So all the duplicates of you is the One Awareness, putting on new garments.
The ego is what we do with our human garments. You could call the Ego matrix a pattern; but it is not all that you are.
In actuality, the only kind of death, that exists, is ego death, but even the ego patterns are probably saved in God's better version of Tiplers physical Omega; a noncorporeal transcendental heaven of all possibilities, outside the domain of space/time, matter/energy.

The societal problems are another matter, and they will exist, if we ever develop teleportation.
I hope we do, but with reservations.

I think that we have to work out exatly what constuites us before we can even think about immoratlity- and it is a hard one because looking at the evidence it is difficult to completely put it down to the physcial brain.

Omnido that makes sense I think you used logic correctly and determined a very cut and dry answer. What confuses me is if you're copying yourself exactly into a computer or whatever your saying the whole transition from each orignal neuron to a synthetic would simply be you making a copy of yourself therefore a being that has all the same experineces as you but is still a differnet person based on the qualifications of true identitiy. But I guess people get tweaked out by the idea of if there is an identical you than how do you know who'se the original? But you clearly pointed out that no matter how similar these two beings are they are still two separate entities and the original is still you. Did I get that right?

Do you want to know, what I am quite certain about? Maybe you don't, but I'll say it anyway.

In the case, that you are conscious - what it is very likely that you are - you are *just* an instance of myself. As any upload would be, or any other sentient anywhere.

Thomas:
Do you want to know, what I am quite certain about? Maybe you don't, but I'll say it anyway.

In the case, that you are conscious - what it is very likely that you are - you are *just* an instance of myself. As any upload would be, or any other sentient anywhere.

Thomas, I want to personally thank you for your alacrity at producing such a concise and perfect description of solipsism. I do not agree with your reasoning or your conclusions but it is so beautifully drawn that very few can misunderstand it.

A little over a year ago in this same thread we had this exchange between you and I here.

What fascinates me is that I am more convinced than ever that we are approaching the ability to achieve "Techlepathy" ahead of organic based telepathy and that what you are describing are the real risks of what some minds are desirous of but not in any way is such behavior inevitable.

That you cannot see past your error of judgment on this is simply due to your personal choices and vindicates the probability that for you such a merger of consciousness would in all likelihood become a traumatic experience wherein you become "consumed" by those you feel obligated to threaten or would in turn consume "others" by insisting on imposing your will as mandated by your psychological desire to rule rather than be ruled but it is also wonderful to understand that not all of us resonate to the same rules.

It is the psychological basis of why cults develop around "personality" now and how many, many people experience their states of rapture associated with their religious identification but it is not logically necessary to be solipsist.

Some of us look at the idea very differently and we engage in the idea of merger with a love of one another such that contrary to your idea we would desire to protect the individuality of others rather than force submission of multiple identities into one being and yet we would willing allow ourselves by this same emotion of love to be merged for it compliments the very act of love making it into an act whereby two people can become so intimate as to become one, and create another.

In the earlier post referenced above I allude to the idea of "psychic vampirism" and this is not Gothic joke, it is a danger described by overly indulging the solipsistic tendency we all share to assert our Nietzschean will to power over Schopenhauer's will to life, but I counter it is balanced by the even greater will to love that mandates logically the preservation of individuality and rational self-sacrifice we demonstrate for all those whose protection becomes a commitment of caring.

It is the desire to love, and more over that such love be more objectively valid by being for another, which requires that we protect and even create individuality instead of creating a simplistic solipsistic singularity.

Yes, Thomas I suspect, well I hope that the SI that creates the Singularity will recognize a "Will to Love" and in fact this is at the heart of a lot of humanity's theological tenets now. Those who seek a doctrine of "Universal Friendship" must also seek to define and describe such a loving algorithm of the will to love for it is a rational prerequisite of altruism and through its discovery I suspect that AI will find its true voice and wax poetic.

Does it also mean the opposite is true? That we are expanding the parameters of human conflict to cosmic proportion? Perhaps, but we won't know till we get there.

Laz - Yes, I am a solipsist. But I am not the only one, and our number rises steadily! [lol]

The pure selflocation algorithm may be enough, may be everything and all, what I really am. More computing power, the brighter sense of me. Mental, memory and sensual surrounding is an independent thing, a scene for my ego. After the Singularity, we should (stay) disperse, since there is an optimal computing area size. A bigger one, would delay the response from far corners and slow down the pace of subjective time - what we don't want to. We want to live as much as possible and not to survive as long as we could.

On the other hand, we will be forced to check out every middle of nowhere, to see if some poor devil hangs there in a discomfort. Not a question of kindness, but of a practical selfishness. A beautiful symmetry, but I don't know, if I should stop worrying now, or it's a good time to panic.

I am just explaining my funny views.

lol

dfowler

Partially. The elements that constitute whom and what we are in terms of consciousness, are defined by transience. One cannot state that the essence of whom they are is merely one singular moment in time. We are the culmination of multiple moments.

The model for explanation that I made reference to was designed to allow for a "method" of retaining what I refer to as:
The Integrated collection of transient consciousness or what has been referred to before as Spatiotemporal Continuity.
The very foundation is based upon active integration and transience, where one element of the human mind is duplicated, then re-integrated into the previous, before the previous is discarded. This preservation is essentially exactly what the human brain does on a neuro-cellular level. We do not merely have one "copy" of any specific information within our collective biological architecture, no. Indeed the mind holds vast resources of "backups" for particular information, and excessive redundancies for particular types of memories. However, those memories or cells whom are not being used are generally discarded due to lack of use, much the same way that muscle tissue will suffer atrophy if not excercised. The mind already does what I have suggessted in reference to uploading or consciousness transference, I merely propose a method for ensuring that the individual who submits themselves to be uploaded, also wakes up the very same person in terms of temporal continuity of consciousness.
Duplication is only part of the process. Active Integration must be used in conjunction with duplication, otherwise you end up with just that: A duplicate. That will not provide any solace to the patient whom after the "upload" still lays on the table looking at his duplicated self, and then looking to the medical staff who are now prepared to administer his own biological death.

The process may seem duplicative, and it is. However, because of the integration, any seperate duplications become re-integrated into one singular system. The ideal of "Transference" instead of "duplication". I would NEVER allow the duplication of my mind without integration. That is where the issues of "Multiple Me's" occur from.

Edited by Omnido, 04 November 2003 - 10:21 AM.

Omnido,

Although our brain cells do not turnover at the rate of some of our other tissues, they still do turnover, Some anti-depressant drugs have been seen to encourage neuronal growth in the hippocampus and this is now thought to be the primary mode of their operation. The fact that neurons do grow in the brain and can be induced to grow brings up the question, "What percentage of the brain constitutes me?" and perhaps "What rate of change of consciousness due to physical and chemical alterations of the brain is acceptable before the person is deemed a 'different' individual than before the change(s) occured?" What we are dealing with here is something more related to time and discontuity of identity rather than the physical substrate which yields the consciousness in question.

People's consciousness' can be radically altered by brain damage by various mechanisms. Are they the same person they were before the damage occured? I think their loved ones would be unwilling to say that they were, due to the discontinuity in their personalities.

What I think is that we are really not the same person from quantum moment to quantum moment and that a new pattern which defines our identity arises as we progress (through time? - or is time created because we progress?). The 'unique' identity that we are is an illusion that cannot be nailed down. To assert that we would NOT be the same upon uploading or duplication is totally true, we would be creating a totally different individual. This however is what I believe occurs naturally from moment to moment and with chainging biology. To replace every neuron in our brain with a computerized equivalent while actively integrating it before tossing away the old biological neurons may give a more comfortable feeling that we are retaining 'who we are' but in reality, there is no continuity to begin with.

A different perspective on this pattern which makes up 'who we are' is necessary. Why do we need to be so egotistical that we are 'unique'. If it were possible to create an exact biological duplicate of a person, the duplicate would only be identical to the original at the instant of creation after which the randomness of molecular motion would begin to have it's influence and draw the line differentiating one from the other forever. If I were able to duplicate myself, would my 'duplicate' care that it wasn't the original? Indeed would the only way the original and duplicate be able to tell which came first would be the fact that the duplicate must necessarily occupy a different position in space? To maintain continuity of identity in this case, perhaps the original would have to be destroyed in the instant of creation of the duplicate and place the 'duplicate' in the exact spatial position of the original so that to all inspection the duplicate IS the original.

just some thoughts..

Interesting idea, but even an instant duplication/destruction would invalidate transient existence.
The idea is not that the duplicate isnt the same as the original. The fact is that the duplicate ISNT the original.

What defines the original?
If we follow the transient theory, we are the sum of our collective experiences based upon moment-to-moment experience and intergration of existing and previous moments. The duplication, while correct at producing a mirrored reflection of all the aforementioned, still remains a time-dependant seperation and isolation. (lots of -tion's there, heh)

The end result is objectively correct: The duplication is not the original.
Ultimately, the quality and quantity of the psychological nature is indeed intact, and the duplicate would correctly assert that it was the same as the original. Only the objective knowledge to the contrary would dispute such a claim, for it is valid in one respect.

To some who would advocate this method, all power to them. I would not allow such a system to be performed upon me, for I know full well that as I was destroyed, the I would never wake up. All would go black, and OmniDo would end. However, OmniDo(A) would exist in my place, and since he would be a duplicate of me, he would ask the same question after the procedure: "Am I the original?" Since I know that I Wouldnt want to exist being a duplicate, I can correctly affirm that my duplicate wouldnt want to either. Thus, my duplicate would feel "Fake" or falsely existent because of the objective knowledge.
However, if my duplicate never knew the truth, that would be a different story.
This is why I advocate Transcience, since it is a crucial part of Duplicative integrational transference.

In the end, even if my theory is proven to be true, some who would wish to undergo such a procedure might not care either way, and that is their choice. Eventually if such a technology is indeed invented, I would advocate the establishment of both methods: Both instantaneous duplication/destruction, and transient integral duplication.
The latter procedure would probably be far more time consuming, as integration requires interaction and awareness, but it is an option that would establish a fundamental value for the meaning of "True Consciousness" as well as solving the "Is this really me?" issue.

We are indeed, a constantly changing people from moment to moment, day to day. That is not in dispute. However, we are always constantly integrating pieces of our previous and exisiting selves to forge new ones. Even while sleeping, this still occurs on a cellular level. The process of pure duplication stops this transience. This is not a question of theory, it is one of fact.
Now whether or not that transience is absolutely necessary, appears at the moment to be purely a issue of personal choice. I for one, will stick with the idea, until proven or demonstrated otherwise as insignificant.

Edited by Omnido, 04 November 2003 - 10:21 AM.

I agree with Kevin's comments, calling yourself "destroyed" just because there was a physical discontinuity is somewhat meaningless, because you would have the same goals and memories as before, just that your physical location or instantiation would be unusually different in an unusually short period of time. You would have no way of knowing if aliens destroy your body each night and replaced it with a near-exact duplicate; it's not the object that matters, but the dynamic pattern persisting through time. Whether or not identity can persist in the absence of transience is a question of neuroscience, not personal choice. Integration of new information can persist over switch of substrate, as long as the switch is orchestrated seamlessly enough.

I have weighed in before and still argue that as discontinuous and chaotic as it may seem to overly ordered minds: "Why not more than one me?"

It certainly increases the idea of viable immortality by redundancy if nothing else. It does however sound like solipsism repackaged to short sighted minds. Imagine being able to integrate a conscience with former lives as some spiritualists suggest is possible; isn't that logically consistent with the "Many Me" theory?

Sorry, as I have said before, I can little resist a good pun. [cry]

In all seriousness the concept of linear versus parallel living experience is merely a question of logical connection and that only introduces the viability of a concept at its minimum. It is a quintessential aspect of what you generally describe in the Third person with reference to the Singularity, but the irony is that such awareness is logically a collective idea focused into a Single coherent awareness/response relationship with reality that is shared by all living beings.

The "Many Me" idea is consistent with a Symbiotic Assimilation of Advanced Intelligence (whether Human and/or Artificial) into a Singularity whether the Singularity Event was friendly or not.

Consider this a prediction predicated on Convergent Evolutionary Theory as it applies to a speciation event of the magnitude our planet is facing. More counterintuitive logic as we are becoming less populated by species even as we speak but humanity seeks to fill each environmental niche faster than it can access all environments to create habitat.

Transhumanism is only one aspect of the bio/techno-logical diaspora of species Earth will soon experience; perhaps on a level to rival the Cambrian Divergence. At least we should hope so because the alternative repression of these energies could be catastrophic and ignoring an issue like "Friendliness" and robotic ethics would be far worse than even just being complacent about the issue. Getting it right will require much more than just luck.

You would have no way of knowing if aliens destroy your body each night and replaced it with a near-exact duplicate; it's not the object that matters, but the dynamic pattern persisting through time. Whether or not identity can persist in the absence of transience is a question of neuroscience, not personal choice.  Integration of new information can persist over switch of substrate, as long as the switch is orchestrated seamlessly enough.

If I were to discover the aforementiond example with the aliens, I would be furious and sorrowful, because my life would be useless. The "real" me would have ended long ago, and I would be merely a shadow. Continuity may be an inherently human concept, but it is nonetheless one that provides me with meaning. Without that meaning, I have no purpose, and without purpose, I have no reason to exist.

It is absolutely personal choice. The procedure can work either way, it would be upto the individual. The "seamlessness" to which you refer completely destroys the transient model, because it presumes that you can create absolute integration in an instant moment of the smallest measurement of time, which has not been demonstrated as even theoretically feasible.

I fail to see why so many disagree with this concept...[huh]
It is a logically valid concept.
My only understanding comes from the realization that many simply "do not care" or that the subject has no relevance to them, and thats perfectly fine. As Ive stated before, those that wish to undergo such a purely duplicative procedure will die forever once it is completed, and their duplicates will falsely assert to everyone else (including themselves) that they are the "same person." I will know better. If that is their choice, then I nor anyone else has any right to remove it from them.
Does spatiotemporal continuity really matter all that much? From a mechanics perspective it does not. From a physcists perspective, it does not. From a purely computational perspective, it does not.
From a spatiotemporal perspective, it damn well does![angry][!]

I guess in the end, its upto the person(s) undergoing the procedure. I will most certainly not allow it to happen to me, and if I ever discover that it was, I will most definately terminate my own false existence if I cannot obsolve some method for re-integration with my former lost self.
Call it a "Philosophers Folly", call it "limited perspective" call it whatever you will. The logic of the argument is still valid, and the concrete fact regarding the issue has yet to be successfully disputed or disproven. [B)]

As to Lazarus's "Many Me's" idea...[huh]
Well, heh, thats a completely alternate twist. Then again, that also changes the entire aspect of the equation. Creating multiple me's for the intended purpose of collaboration is an alltogether different story. If the original were to be comfortable with the idea, then its duplicates would as well. I suppose I could be comfortable with that aspect, but that still proves my point even more soundly. Multiple Me's would stray from the one, and develop their own interests that were merely equilaterally based upon identical foundations. However, in the end, we have a deviation from a singular existence.
Even if 1,000 duplicated Me's survived and only I were to die for whatever reason, that does not change the fact that I am still dead!
The other me's are reflections of myself, and are equally considered in whole if not in part, "me". However, they are not connected to me beyond my own physical death, unless we are to presuppose that the sum of all human consciousness is not bound or determined by neuroscience.
Thats a gamble Id rather not take.

So in the end, the arguement is still valid, and still irrefuteable to those whom have concern for their spatiotemporal continuity.
If I happen to end up being the last immortalist who decides his fate upon this principle, then so be it. [:o]

Edited by Omnido, 04 November 2003 - 10:11 AM.

Omnido,

What if one day you walked in to your friendly neighborhood neural replacement center they replaced half of your brain with a silicon/polymer replica.. keeping the half they removed in cryonics. The following afternoon they remove and replace the other half of your brain and place the removed half with it's partner in cyronics. An arbitrary length of time later, the two halves stored on ice are then reunited in your cloned body...

Who's the original? The two 'original' halves that knowingly submitted to being placed on ice and were in the original body.. but experienced discontinuity? ... or the two halves which experienced the more seamless continuation of consciousness but are made up of the 'artificial' neurons?